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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen a number of attempts to employ contemporary methods of 
research in political science to study transitional political processes in the newly 
emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In many in-
stances these attempts are difficult to make, and there is a large degree of uncertainty 
in the interpretation of :findings. The difficulties of studying newborn democracies in 
transition emerge from several different sources. 
First, there is no baseline for this type of research. In other words, there is no 
conventional wisdom about how to approach many of the problems that arise during 
the transitional processe. Furthermore, there is no common agreement as to what 
the problems really are. The processes of political development seem to be so volatile 
that every new election, every new legislative institution, and every new political 
twist present scholars with a unique set of puzzles and challenges without any recipes 
for how to solve them. For example, little is known about legislative behavior of 
representatives who know for sure that the probability of their legislature surviving 
the full term is zero, as was the case in the Russian Congress of Peoples' Deputies. 
This institution began its work as the highest lawmaking authority in Russia, within 
the Soviet Union. After the USSR collapsed and the presidency in Russia had been 
established, the Congress found itself in the middle o'f:.a completely different political 
game. How did this influence the Congress and its behavior? There is no reference 
point in answering this question because such problems have never arisen before. 
Secondly, in most instances the rules of the game are either not defined or are 
not binding on the players. In contemporary political science there is a variety of 
models which produce predictions about outcomes of different political processes, and 
also a variety of empirical methods to test the predictions. Most of these methods 
and models are based on a set of assumptions that people are rational, and rules 
of the game are well defined and enforceable. Unfortunately, these assumptions can 
"' . I 
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hardly be sustained during transitional political processes. For example, in Russia 
campaigning politicians are often uncertain if their appeals should be addressed to 
voters, who are supposed to vote for them, or to the heads of local elites, who still act 
like czars in many of the regions. Furthermore, the laws which regulate pre-election 
campaigns are not binding for some candidates, but are for others. All this makes it 
difficult to apply standard western reasoning about voting and electoral behavior to 
elections in Russia. 
Third, it is often very problematic, if not impossible, to obtain data for empirical 
research. Following the tradition of the old Soviet regime, when all real data which 
concerned the USSR were considered to be classified information, nowadays there is 
still no such thing as "data available to the public." On those rare occasions when 
it is required by law that data be disclosed to the public, government officials do all 
their best to resist. In 1994 and 1995 Russian State Duma voted seven times to make 
the chair of the Central Election Commission publish the results of the December 
1993 parliamentary elections. All these attempts were ignored. Furthermore, even if 
the data or other information becomes available, questions arise about its reliability 
and authenticity. 
Thus it is clear that research which concerns transitional political processes to 
democracy requires more than just the use of conventional means to analyze standard 
problems that stable democratic countries usually face. It is often necessary to take 
into account a number of specific and unique factors for a particular country and time 
period which, combined with appropriate modeling and methodology, might produce 
results substantially different from what one might infer by merely looking at a process 
from a standard point of view. The purpose of this dissertation is to identify and 
study a number of such phenomena in Russian politics between 1990 and 1995, in 
the context of political and economic reforms, by taking into account all surrounding 
factors. The phenomena that are studied here represent some of the key issues to 
understanding how transitional processes in Russian politics actually work, and what 
one should expect in the future. The main contribution of the dissertation is that the 
results of extensive formal and empirical analysis presented here solve some of the 
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problems which are viewed by many scholars as puzzles of the transitional period in 
Russian politics or, at best, have a number of different explanations. 
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay addresses a general issue 
of parliaments in transition by focusing on the Russian Congress of Peoples' Deputies. 
The study of political institutions in the process of reform provides a valuable op-
portunity for better understanding a number of key factors related to transitional 
processes. Examples of such factors are the formation of political parties, the adop-
tion of constitutional amendments, the design of election laws, voting behavior and 
legislative organization. Until recently researchers did not have many of opportunities 
to study how transitional processes affect relationships between those factors and po-
litical institutions. Instead, much of the theoretical as well as empirical work has been 
done in this field under the assumption of stability as a key axiom. A new era began 
in late 1980's, with most of the Eastern European countries having started transi-
tions from authoritarian regimes to what, they believed, would eventually become 
democracies. Not surprisingly, many scholars devoted a great deal of attention to 
the development of emerging political institutions and party systems (Kitshelt 1992, 
McGregor 1993). A number of studies have taken Russia as a subject of research in 
this area (Remington, Smith, Kiewiet and Haspel 1994; Tolz 1990; Wyman, Miller 
and Heywood 1994). In the view of many analysts and scholars, one of the keys to 
better understand changes in Russian political institutions is to find explanations for 
the conflict between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, which ultimately led to the violent 
demise of the Congress. Some people even argued that "the violent aftermath of 
the confrontation between president and parliament casts doubt on the prospects for 
democratic consolidation in Russia" (Remington 1994). 
It has been commonly believed that the struggle between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov 
was the result of a constitutional crisis over the respective powers of president and 
parliament which, in turn, was an outgrowth of questions unresolved in the Soviet 
Period. Gorbachev's attempt to infuse democratic practice into soviet structures was 
a logical impossibility, since the theory of the soviets as the institutional embodiment 
of state power had never been more than a tactic for seizing power and legitimating 
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Bolshevik party rule (Anweiler 1974). The soviets in practice had never fused leg­
islative and executive power since both had always lain elsewhere, in the Communist 
Party. Gorbachev's initial model would have to have been modified sooner or later to 
resolve the question of relationship between executive and legislative power. As a re­
sult, in many of the republics of the former USSR where the legislatures had assumed 
some power, executive-legislative confrontation has followed. Russia presents a very 
striking example of such a confrontation following the creation of the new presidency, 
Yeltsin's departure from the legislative branch to fill it, and the deepening rift be­
tween two branches over their rightful powers to oversee the government at a time 
of momentous social and economic change. The situation was aggravated in that the 
Speaker of the RCPD, Khasbulatov, was seen to wield an extremely high degree of 
agenda control in the formation of public policy. With its roots in the old regime, 
the position of the Speaker resembled that of Bosses Cannon during the late 19th 
Century which is referred as "Czar Rule" (Jones 1968).
But does the conventional wisdom correctly account for the truth? Was the con­
flict constitutional in nature? Was the RCPD truly subject to Czar Rule? To answer 
these questions I construct a formal model, based upon the rules and structure of the 
Russian Congress of Peoples' Deputies, and, then, characterize equilibrium strategies 
pursued by an agenda-setting Speaker. In conjunction with information about the 
distribution of preferences in the RCPD, the Czar Rule model yields several testable 
hypothesis. The model receives some empirical backing, but overall the results of the 
analysis do not support it. Therefore, the conflict between Yeltsin government and 
the RCPD should be attributed to fundamental disagreements over policy and not to 
internal contradictions in constitutional design.
The second part of the dissertation is devoted to the study of elections and electoral 
preferences in Russia. On 17 December 1995, Russian voters elected representatives to 
the lower house of the parliament, the State Duma. In spite of the cold winter, the fact 
that the election did not include balloting on the presidency, and was contested by 43 
parties, 65 percent of the eligible voters turned out to vote. Historically the conduct of 
this election should be viewed as an encouraging step toward democracy. On the other
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hand, the results seemed not to be so positive for Russia's future. A quick look at the 
election results shows that "opposition" parties - those who campaigned against the 
government and reforms - in most instances did better compared to their performance 
in the December 1993 parliamentary elections. The :flagship of the anti-reformist 
movement - the Communist Party of Russian Federation - managed to receive almost 
25 percent of the total vote. Even though the nationalist party headed by Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii collected only 50 percent of its previous support, it finished second in 
the race. Three other representatives of this camp narrowly failed to overcome the 
5 percent cutoff barrier which was necessary to qualify for seats in the parliament. 
On the other side of the spectrum, only two of the reformist parties - the "party of 
power" headed by the Prime Minister Victor Chernomirdin, and Grigory Yalinsky's 
"Yabloko" - gained seats in Duma by finishing third and fourth respectively. 
But what do these results say about what is happening today in Russia? Do 
they confirm that Russia is still on the path to democracy, or do they suggest that 
Russia is creeping closer to renewed instability or a rollback of the economic reform 
process which began in 1992? As mentioned above, almost five years after the fall 
of the Soviet Union, scholars and analysts still do not share a common description 
of the processes unfolding in Russia, much less agree on how to explain them. The 
debate about how to interpret results of elections is not an exception here. In place of 
hypothesis-testing or theory-building, discussion about Russia's transitional elections 
is shaped by a dichotomy of "optimists" vs. "pessimists." This applies not only to 
the most recent parliamentary elections, but also to almost all previous ones. For 
example, Remington (1994) calls the December 1993 elections "the most stunning 
example of anti-democratic backlash," referring to the unusually high percentage of 
votes received by Zhirinovsky's LDPR party. On the other hand, some other authors 
(McFaul 1994) argue that Russian electors voted for reforms, since pro-government 
parties received about 60 percent of the vote. The same duality in explaining the 
election results continued after the last election. Jerry Hough (1996) writes that the 
gains achieved by Communists between 1993 and 1995 will likely result in their victory 
in the 1996 presidential elections. In contrast, Sobyanin and Petrov (1996) show that 
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anti-reformist voters still do not account for more than one third of electorate, thus, 
making the Communist victory a highly unlikely outcome.
In an effort to move discussion about Russian electorate beyond the dispute be­
tween pessimists and optimists, in the second essay of the dissertation I present and 
test an empirical model of changes in Russia's voters' preferences between 1991 and 
1995. This model presents an opportunity to test a number of hypothesis about Rus­
sian electorate such as: did those voters who supported Boris Yeltsin and reforms 
continue doing this in 1993 and 1995, or they became dissatisfied with the govern­
ment, and switched to the communists? Who benefited mostly from sharp decrease 
in voters' turnout between 1991 and 1995? Answers to such questions not only leave 
no room for dual interpretation of the events, but also reveal if Russian people are 
indeed on their way toward democracy. The main difference of my approach to the 
problem from that of other scholars is that I use a unique and most extensive data set 
on Russian elections - about 2000 observations - which allows me to employ econo­
metric techniques and test real hypotheses instead of just speculating on the basis of 
national aggregate totals.
Finally, the last part of the dissertation addresses the problem of detecting pos­
sible election fraud using aggregated voting data. Fraud, virtually everyone agrees, 
should not be allowed to decide the election of a public official or a representative. 
This problem is especially important for the countries which just recently started 
conducting free and democratic elections. In these states voters still have strong 
memories of how elections were conducted in the past, and, therefore, they can be 
easy targets for officials who have incentives to manipulate election outcomes. This 
is clearly the case in Russia, since the results of democratic reforms there are only 
visible in a handful of major industrial cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. The 
rest of the country still lives under the rules which where in effect in the 1960s and 
1970s. More specifically, in most of the Russia's regions, local authorities acquired the 
same power, and use the same rules, to govern as did the former Communist Party 
officials. Moreover, in many instances, these authorities and the former Communist 
bosses are the very same people. Thus, as far as elections are concerned, suspicions
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arise about how truthful are the elections' results, which are counted and reported 
by these bosses. In many cases suspicions are aggravated by the fact that the bosses 
themselves are candidates, and voting data never became available for the public 
except for that aggregated at the national level. 
Since the incentives for election fraud exist, as well as opportunities, the question 
is whether or not fraud can be detected using just voting data. Of course there is no 
scientific method capable of supporting the hypothesis about foul play with certainty. 
One might argue that no matter how weird the data look, voters simply voted that 
way. This might be the reason why there has been virtually no work done in this 
field by scholars. Although the methods and results presented in the last essay of the 
disserfatiOti' give skeptics a rigorous basis for arguing about the probabilities that an 
election was stolen, what is argued here offers a glimpse at the no-man's land where 
the law's wish for certainty meets a reality that many events can be explained only 
in terms of chance, and that alternative explanations always exist. 
The way I proceed is by making assumptions about what "regular" election results 
should look versus "irregular" ones. Then I use voting data to detect the irregularities. 
Finally, the hypothesis of election fraud being behind the irregularities is contrasted to 
other alternative models. Thus, the strategy of the essay is to act as prosecution does 
during a jury trial if only circumstantial evidence is available. Of course this type of 
analysis cannot be used as evidence to indict those people who run the elections, but 
it can be used to detect specific districts where investigation into electoral procedures 




Chapter 2 Czar Rule in the Russian 
Congress of Peoples' Deputies 
Introduction 
Political scientists have become increasingly concerned with understanding how the 
ways in which legislatures are organized and the rules under which they operate affect 
the choices they make. Prominent examples of work in this area include studies of 
amendment rules in the U.S. House (Ordeshook and Schwartz 1987, Weingast 1992), 
unanimous consent agreements in the U.S. Senate (Krehbiel 1986), the "guillotine" 
and en bloc voting procedures used in the French National Assembly (Huber 1992), 
and the right of the government in the Italian parliament to propose final amendments 
(Heller 1994). These studies typically seek to gauge the potential for agenda setting, 
i.e., the extent to which strategically placed groups or individuals can exploit the 
structure and rules of the legislature to obtain more preferred outcomes. Agenda 
setting can mean simply the ability to offer proposals for consideration (Baron and 
Ferejohn 1989). It can also refer to the ability to bundle multiple proposals into one 
package (Ferejohn 1986), to determine the sequence in which competing measures 
are considered (Plott and Levine 1978), and even to select the method of voting to 
be used (Plott 1982).1 Often it is meant to describe the extreme case of monopoly 
proposal power, wherein no one other than the agenda-setter may offer proposals or 
amendments (Niskanen 1971; Romer and Rosenthal 1979; Denzau and Mackay 1983; 
Krehbiel 1987). 
In this chapter we analyze the structure, the rules, and the agenda-setting possi-
bilities they created in one of the more important voting bodies ever assembled-the 
Russian Congress of People's Deputies (RCPD). The RCPD was a 1068-member leg-
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islature elected in March 1990, from single-member districts.2 Over the next three 
years it convened nine times, subjecting over two thousand proposals to roll call votes. 
The RCPD played a crucial role in the struggle which ultimately led to the demise of 
the Soviet Union and collapse of the Communist Party. After electing Boris Yeltsin 
its Speaker, it approved the Decree on Power which asserted the sovereignty of the 
Russian state. In May of 1991 it voted to create the office of President, to be chosen 
through popular election. After the coup attempt of August 1991 it voted to allow 
newly elected President Yeltsin to rule by decree. 
But while the RCPD supported Yeltsin in undermining Gorbachev and the Soviet 
Union, it subsequently resisted the measures Yeltsin and his government proposed 
to achieve a more market-oriented economy. Under the leadership of Ruslan Khas-
bulatov, Yeltsin's successor as Speaker, the Congress also sought repeatedly to shift 
policymaking authority away from the executive branch to the legislative.3 The RCPD 
ousted many of Yeltsin's top ministers, most notably Yegor Gaidar, and sought re-
peatedly to impeach Yeltsin himself. 
In both Russia and abroad, the struggle between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov was 
often portrayed as a personal one, growing out of raw political ambition and the 
mutual desire to destroy the other. To a large extent, however, the conflict seems 
the inevitable consequence of a deep constitutional flaw. With its origins in the old 
regime, the RCPD maintained the "nesting-dolls" structure of a Congress directed 
by its Supreme Soviet, which in turn was to follow the lead of a still smaller steering 
committee, the Presidium. The Speaker of the Congress, who was simultaneously 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and of the Presidium, was seen to wield an extremely 
high degree of control over the formation of public policy. The Speaker's commanding 
position was reminiscent of that of Bosses Cannon and Reed in the U.S. Congress 
during the late 19th Century-a regime that political historians refer to, ironically 
enough, as "Czar Rule" (Jones 1968). According to one editorialist, "Today, as Stalin 
did at one time, Khasbulatov has concentrated enormous powers in his hands ... one 
day quite soon ... we will wake up and discover to our astonishment that all power in 
the country in fact belongs to Ruslan Imranovich" (Bondarev, 1992, p. 4). 
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Establishment of a powerful Presidency without altering the status of the Speaker 
would thus imply that Russia effectively had two heads of state (Mishin 1992). Or, as 
Krivstov (1993) put it, "Attempts by the two leaders (Khasbulatov and Yeltsin) to ac-
cumulate all power into the hands of one of them, and the fight resulting from that, has 
its historical roots ... The country, which was ruled by tsars for centuries, cannot bear 
two tsars at once." Khasbulatov, in turn, repeatedly asserted that the Yeltsin govern-
ment was building a "neototalitarian political structure," and that the RCPD, under 
his leadership, was the only reliable barrier against dictatorship (Chugayev 1993). 
The crisis ultimately flared into the violent and tumultuous events of September and 
October of 1993, when Yeltsin dissolved the RCPD and suppressed the insurrection 
that Khasbulatov, Rutskoi, and opposition deputies had fomented. 
But was this historic conflict truly constitutional in nature? Was the Speaker a 
competing head of state? To shed any light on this matter requires us to answer the 
prior question of whether or not the Speaker did in fact dominate the RCPD. Put 
another way, was the RCPD subject to Czar Rule? 
We begin our analysis of these issues by identifying the major rules governing 
the legislative process in the RCPD, focusing specifically upon the agenda-setting 
capabilities they conveyed to the Speaker. We then construct a formal model based 
upon these rules in order to characterize equilibrium strategies pursued by an agenda-
setting Speaker. This model, in conjunction with information about the distribution 
of policy preferences in the RCPD, yields a number of empirically testable hypothe-
ses. We test these hypotheses with roll call voting data from the Fourth and Sixth 
Congresses of the RCPD, which met in May 1991, and April 1992, respectively. 
Structure and Rules of the RCPD 
During its brief history the RCPD itself convened only sporadically, in sessions that 
usually ran for only a week or two at a time. Day-to-day legislative business was 
thus conducted in the Supreme Soviet (frequently referred to as the Parliament), 
which was composed of a large subset (252 deputies) of the RCPD's membership. 
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The Supreme Soviet also fell well short of being a full-time professional legislature, 
and correspondingly delegated the role of formulating an agenda to the Presidium 
(Remington, Davidheiser, and Smith 1992). Composed of the Speaker, a chief deputy 
and four other deputy speakers, chairs of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, 
as well as chairs of its commissions and committees, the Presidium contained 35 
members in all. 
Following conventional soviet form, the Speaker of the Congress was simultane-
ously Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Presidium. The Speaker's 
ability to shape proposals to be presented to the Congress would thus appear to be 
formidable indeed. As Remington, Smith, Kiewiet, and Haspel (1994) put it, "Wield-
ing substantial power over all aspects of the legislative process, the right to adopt 
certain kinds of decrees, and responsibility for the day-to-day management of the 
Supreme Soviet, the Presidium enabled an ambitious chairman to develop a signif-
icant power base independent of the executive branch (p. 231)." Indicative of the 
Speaker's sway over legislative business was the fact that the Presidium frequently 
held closed sessions in Khabulatov's personal office (Remington, Davidheiser, and 
Smith, 1992). According to one critic, Khasbulatov ruled his parliamentary support-
ers with "a rod of iron" (Bondarev 1992). 
The Speaker also appointed members to the many committees and commissions 
of the Supreme Soviet (deputies did not have to be members of the Supreme Soviet 
to serve on its committees). Such appointments brought with them a supplemental 
salary, an office, an apartment in Moscow, and an automobile-important material 
incentives given that the official salary of deputies was only slightly higher than that 
of an average industrial worker (Remington, Davidheiser, and Smith 1992). Presum-
ably his ability to allocate such "perks" garnered the Speaker more deference and 
cooperation than would have otherwise been the case. 
Upon convening for the first time in May 1990, deputies elected to the RCPD voted 
to abide by the "Temporary Rules of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies." 
These rules were virtually identical to the rules governing the Union Congress of 
People's Deputies, which in turn drew heavily upon rules governing Congresses of the 
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Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Given that Party Congresses had routinely 
adopted all measures recommended by the General Secretary by a unanimous vote, 
it is not remarkable that such details of parliamentarianism as quorum requirements 
and amendment procedures failed to receive much scrutiny. 
These rules stipulated that any group, fraction, or bloc could bring proposals to 
the floor after obtaining support from one-fifth of the full membership.4 One-fifth of 
the full membership could also demand a roll call vote. The RCPD also established an 
Editorial Committee which could bring forth proposals, or, more commonly, amend-
ments, to proposals under consideration. Almost all major legislative proposals, how-
ever, were reported to the Congress by the Supreme Soviet. Proposals to amend the 
Russian Constitution, which made up the lion's share of legislative business in some 
sessions, were required to have come through the Supreme Soviet. 
Consideration of legislation by the RCPD was to begin with a vote to accept a 
bill "as background;" if that vote carried, amendments were then in order. In the 
Sixth Congress and in subsequent sessions, however, the RCPD frequently dispensed 
with the initial vote and simply began working on the bill after its introduction by 
Speaker Khasbulatov. All amendments were submitted to the Speaker, who then 
decided the order in which they would be considered. Once an amendment was ap-
proved, the amended version of the proposal became the current version of legislation. 
Amendments could pertain to only one article or chapter of a bill, which implied that 
amendments to derail consideration of the bill (say by striking the enacting clause) 
were not in order. After all amendments were acted upon, the RCPD took a final 
vote to accept the resultant legislation "as a whole." 
At any point in the amendment process the Speaker could propose that the 
Congress adopt the current version of the bill as a whole without further amend-
ments. The Speaker could also employ the Editorial Committee as a mechanism for 
bringing new amendments to the floor. Indeed, Khasbulatov frequently relied upon 
this committee, which most observers viewed to be his agent, to construct substitute 
bills that were submitted to the RCPD for an up-or-down vote. 
A vote of one-half of the full number of elected deputies was required for passage 
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of ordinary legislation, but amendments to the Constitution required the approval of 
two-thirds of the full membership. Because approval thresholds were based upon the 
full membership rather than members present and voting, not voting was functionally 
equivalent to voting no. Once the Congress accepted as background a proposal to 
amend the Constitution, any amendment to that proposal also required approval 
by two-thirds of the full number of elected deputies. As we shall see, this highly 
idiosyncratic rule had tremendous implications for the workings of the RCPD and for 
the agenda-setting possibilities available to the Speaker. 
In the following section we construct a model of Czar Rule, a model which has 
much in common with the setter model of Romer and Rosenthal (1979) and with the 
monopolistic committee model of Denzau and Mackay (1983). Because of their sub-
stantive importance, we focus upon the consideration of constitutional amendments, 
which, as indicated above, required approval by two-thirds of the entire membership. 
As is always the case, there is an inescapable tension between the imperatives 
of the model-clarity, simplicity, and logical consistency-and the substantive phe-
nomenon being modeled, which is inevitably far more complicated, conditional, and 
ambiguous. It should also be kept in mind that the model and the assumptions that 
underlie it are not meant to mirror reality as closely as possible, but rather to identify 
a particular set of conditions that would allow an agenda-setting Speaker to exercise 
Czar Rule. From such a model we hope to derive empirically testable hypotheses that 
would not otherwise have been surmised. Combined with knowledge of the distribu-
tion of preferences in the RCPD, our model of Czar ':e,ule does in fact yield a number 
of predictions regarding bill introduction, amendment activity, and the division of 
roll call votes. To the extent the hypotheses derived from this model are supported 
by the data, the RCPD can be characterized as having been subject to Czar Rule. 
A Model of Czar Rule 
We denote the status quo (which we assume to be e;x:ogenous) as B 0 , and a proposal 
" 
to change it as B*. The Speaker's agenda-setting,'.powers in the Presidium and in 
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the Supreme Soviet are assumed to allow him to control proposals reported to the 
Congress by the Supreme Soviet, so we assume that the Speaker chooses B*. This 
is admittedly an extreme assumption; among other things, in principle a majority of 
the RCPD could always vote to elect a new Speaker if dissatisfied with the current 
one. The assumption, however, is also a crucial one: a Speaker without the ability 
to substantially shape proposals emerging from the Presidium and Supreme Soviet 
could not effect Czar Rule. As can be gathered from the discussion above, our case 
for the plausibility of this assumption rests primarily upon the Speaker's control 
over appointments to the Presidium and to the Supreme Soviet, its committees, and 
commissions. It is also the case that this assumption is very similar to that made by 
Romer and Rosenthal (1979) in applying their agenda-setting model to local school 
referenda. 5 
The initial vote taken is to approve B* as background, i.e., B* is posed against 
B 0 . If B* fails, B0 remains in force. If B* passes, it becomes the new status quo 
and consideration of amendments begins. Deputies, after observing B 0 and B*, each 
choose whether or not to offer amendments. The Speaker then chooses the order in 
which amendments are to be voted on, and the deputies subsequently observe the 
set of amendments that the Speaker has ordered for consideration. The next vote 
is B* versus the first amendment. If it passes, the amended bill becomes a current 
status quo. Otherwise B* remains the current status quo and is voted against the 
second amendment, and so on. B 1 is the proposal which remains after all amendments 
have been considered. (B1 = B* if all amendments were rejected.) The final vote in 
the sequence is to accept the bill "as a whole," i.e., B 1 versus B 0 . As pointed out 
earlier, the Speaker can also choose to ask for consideration of the bill as a whole 
(i.e., final passage) without amendments, or, at any point in the sequence, without 
any subsequent amendments. 
We assume that each deputy i (with i* corresponding to the Speaker) has an ideal 
point hi along a single dimension, that all preferences are single-peaked, and that 
the shape of utility functions is invariant to location in the policy space.6 We also 
assume that all deputies have complete information about all other deputies' utility 
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functions, including that of the Speaker. How much of an abstraction is it to assume 
that the policy space is unidimensional? Not much, we think. Previous studies of the 
RCPD indicate that voting patterns were dominated by support for or opposition to 
a nexus of political and economic reforms-the devolution of power away from the 
Union, the elimination of the Communist Party's constitutional guarantee of power, a 
transition to a more market-oriented economy, and respect for human rights (Smyth 
1990; Embree, 1991; Sobianin, 1993; Remington, Smith, and Kiewiet 1994). 
Because preferences are single-peaked, each deputy will have, for every alternative 
being considered, another point that provides an identical amount of utility (except, 
of course, for his ideal point). Because the deputy is indifferent between these two 
alternatives, this point is called an indifference point. Thus the point ri ( x) is an 
indifference point for deputy i relative to a point x iff Ui(ri(x)) = Ui(x) and ri(x) =f. x. 
We further assume that deputies vote sincerely, which means that on each roll call 
they vote for the alternative that is closer to their own ideal point. The pairing of 
any two alternatives thus produces a cutpoint in the distribution: all deputies on one 
side of the cutpoint vote for the bill, while all those on the other side vote against it. 
As noted previously, constitutional amendments required approval by two-thirds 
of the entire membership. Once the RCPD accepted as background a proposal to 
amend the Constitution, subsequent attempts to amend that proposal also required 
approval by two-thirds of the full membership. This has a very important implication. 
It means that any point located between the ideal point of the one-third voter on the 
reform-anti-reform dimension (i.e., one-third of the deputies are to his left, two-
thirds to his right) and the ideal point of the two-thirds voter (two-thirds of the 
deputies are to his left, one-third to his right) cannot be beaten in pairwise voting 
by any other point. If these ideal points are denoted as c1 and c2 respectively, the 
interval [c1 .. c2] (the middle third of the preference distribution) is thus the core of the 
voting game.7 
For a point to be in the core does not mean that it would be approved by either 
two-thirds or even by a simple majority. Whether or not it is approved depends 
upon the alternative it is paired against. What it does mean is that once a point 
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in the core is accepted as the status quo, it cannot subsequently be defeated by any 
other proposal. The deputies whose ideal points are at c1 and c2 are indexed l and r, 
respectively. We also refer to them as the one-third pivotal voter and the two-thirds 
pivotal voter. 
We now consider equilibrium strategies and outcomes, under the assumptions of 
sincere voting and complete information, given different locations of the initial status 
quo B 0 and the Speaker's ideal point. The Speaker acts to achieve a final outcome 
that is as close to his ideal point as possible. All deputies, as indicated earlier, 
are assumed in each pairwise vote to vote for the alternative that is closer to their 
own ideal point, and a supermajority of two-thirds of the membership is required for 
approval. Proofs of the following propositions are provided in the Appendix, but they 
can also be readily verified by referring to the configurations portrayed in Figures 1 
and 2. The following discussion assumes, for the sake of brevity, that all deputies are 
voting. 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
Suppose B 0 belongs to the core, which is the middle third of the distribution 
bounded by c1 and c2 . In this case any B* brought to the :floor will fail to muster a two-
thirds majority against B 0 , and the Speaker cannot subsequently achieve anything 
other than B 0 . But what if B 0 lay to the left of the core, i.e., B 0 < c1), as shown in 
Figure 1? If the Speaker's ideal point is also to the left of B 0 , he will simply choose 
not to make a proposal and retain B 0 . If the Speaker's ideal point is between B 0 and 
c1 (which is the ideal point of the one-third pivotal voter and thus the left edge of the 
core), the outcome is whichever of these two points the Speaker prefers. He achieves 
B 0 by offering nothing and c1 by offering c1 . 8 
As we continue to move the Speaker's ideal point to the right, however, we see 
that the Speaker can achieve any point in the interval [c1 ; r 1(B0)], which is the interval 
bounded by the ideal point of the one-third pivotal voter (the edge of the core) and 
by the indifference point of the pivotal voter vis-a-vis (B0). If the Speaker's ideal 
point is inside the interval, he can thus achieve it by offering his ideal point as B*. 
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If his ideal point is to the right of this interval, then the best he can achieve is the 
indifference point of the pivotal voter, r1(B0).9 
What happens if the status quo is to the right of the core, i.e., B 0 > c2? As shown 
in Figure 2, the outcomes are perfectly symmetrical to those that obtain when the 
status quo is to the left of the core. We need only to substitute "left" for "right," c1 
for c2 , and r1(B0) for rr(B0). 
We can now see that the Czar Rule model differs from previous setter models 
in a fundamental way. In the setter model, strategic advantage derives from having 
monopoly proposal power; there are always a range of alternatives that can defeat 
the setter's proposal in pairwise voting, but the agenda-setter can simply block con-
sideration of majority-preferred alternatives. The· large core resulting from the two-
thirds majority requirement, however, means that Czar Rule does not hinge on having 
monopoly proposal power. The key is instead the right to make the initial proposal. 
As long as B* is in the core, there are no points preferred to it by two-thirds of the 
voters, and all attempts to defeat it fail. 
As indicated earlier, the rules of the RCPD conveyed to the Speaker tremendous 
sway over the amendment process. He could determine the order of amendments, 
and at any time propose to halt amendment activity and call for a final vote. Work-
ing through the Editorial Committee, he could even submit entirely new versions of 
bills. Another implication of the large core in the Czar Rule model, then, is that the 
Speaker's strategic placement of the initial proposal to the RCPD obviates the role 
of amendments in the process, and renders superfluous these many additional parlia-
mentary privileges. In a nutshell, the Czar Rule model implies that any proposal that 
the Speaker puts forth to the Congress should be in the core. The Congress should 
therefore accept all such proposals and reject any attempts to amend them. 
Empirical Implications 
As outline above, the Czar Rule model is quite general. What the Speaker pro-
poses and what he can achieve depend upon exactly how the status quo, the core, 
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the Speaker's ideal point, and the preferences of the deputies are configured. Before 
we can derive any hypotheses we must therefore estimate some key distributional 
parameters. The methodology we employ for this task is the NOMINATE proce-
dure developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985), which uses roll call voting data to 
simultaneously estimate the spatial locations of voters, cutpoints, and alternatives. 
We use data from two Congresses, the Fourth and the Sixth, that are of particular 
importance and interest. First, because the Czar Rule model pertains to bills in which 
approval by a two-thirds supermajority is required, we need constitutional bills in 
order to test it. The deputies acted upon a much larger number of constitutional 
matters in these two congresses than in any others. The Fourth dealt primarily with 
a series of measures related to the creation of the office of the Presidency and to the 
conduct of presidential elections. The Sixth voted on a large number of constitutional 
questions in what eventually turned out to be an unsuccessful attempt to achieve 
reform through article-by-article amendments to the 1978 Constitution. In addition 
to considering guarantees of human rights and social welfare, the Sixth Congress 
acted upon several proposals to shift power away from the executive branch to the 
legislative. 
Secondly, even though the Congresses were held less than a year apart, they were 
run by two different speakers in two very different contexts. The Fourth, presided over 
by Boris Yelstin, was held in May 1991. This was during the period of confrontation 
between Yeltsin and the RCPD on one side and Gorbachev and the failing Soviet 
regime on the other, a period which culminated in the failed coup attempt of August. 
The Sixth, presided over by Ruslan Khasbulatov, met in April 1992. By this time 
the euphoria of the previous fall had faded, and disenchantment with reform and 
with the Yeltsin government was rising. If the results of our analyses are similar in 
these two very different Congresses, we can thus have considerable confidence in their 
robustness. 
As advised by Poole and Rosenthal, in running NOMINATE we eliminated roll 
calls in which less than 2.5 percent of the deputies were on the minority side. This 
resulted in a sample of 190 roll call votes in the Fourth Congress and 528 in the 
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Sixth. The first dimension fitted by NOMINATE correctly classified 85.2 and 84.9 
percent of the votes, respectively. Fitting a second and a third dimension resulted in 
an improvement in classification accuracy of less than one percent. 10 While we do not 
reject the presence of multidimensionality in the data, voting behavior in the Fourth 
and Sixth Congresses of the RCPD can be largely accounted for by a one-dimensional, 
pro-reform anti-reform policy dimension. 
NOMINATE estimates of deputies' locations are normalized, putting the extreme 
pro-reform score at -1 and the most anti-reform at + 1. Figures 3 and 4 display the dis-
tributions of deputies' NOMINATE scores in the Fourth and Sixth Congresses of the 
RCPD, respectively. Because the roll calls from each Congress were scaled separately, 
cross-the-board movements in the entire membership cannot be detected. However, 
comparison of the two figures shows that a bimodal distribution with roughly equal 
shares of deputies in the reformist and antireformist camps gave way to unimodal dis-
tribution centered on the right (antireformist) side of the spectrum. Sobianin (1993) 
and many other observers of the RCPD also note a shrinkage over time in the re-
formist ranks. This is consistent with their observations, and bolsters confidence in 
the validity of the NOMINATE scores. 
Figures 3 and 4 about here 
Additional evidence concerning NOMINATE scores is provided in Table 1, which 
reports the average scores for different fractions in the Sixth Congress along with a) 
average factor analysis scores for the same fractions ~aken from Remington, Smith, 
and Kiewiet, 1994), and b) government support scores, calculated as percent voting 
yes minus percent voting no on a key no confidence motion (Yakovenko 1992). As 
these data show, NOMINATE and factor analysis generate scalings that closely re-
semble each other, and that also coincide with journalistic assessments of the relative 
ideological positions of RCPD fractions on the reform-antireform dimension.11 
Table 1 about here 




estimated to be -.39 and -.17, respectively, placing both solidly in the ranks of the pro-
reform fractions. Yeltsin's placement comes as no surprise, but Khasbulatov's might. 
Before entering political life, Khasbulatov had been a leading free-market economist 
at the Plekhanov Institute, a proponent of private property rights, and a reliable 
Yeltsin supporter. Supporters of reform, however, charged that upon succeeding to 
the Speakership he had treacherously sold them out, joining with the opposition in a 
crass bid for political power. Khasbulatov repeatedly protested that he was seeking 
only to slow the otherwise reckless pace of reform, and to guard against dictatorial 
tendencies emerging in the executive branch (a concern shared by many democrats). 
Whatever the case, we accept the NOMINATE estimate of Khasbulatov's ideal point 
as the best available. 
Determining the location of the one-third and two-thirds pivotal voters, and thus 
the edges of the core, is a bit tricky. As noted previously, approval thresholds in the 
RCPD were based upon the full membership and not upon those present, meaning 
that not voting was equivalent to voting "no." Consequently, as the proportion 
of deputies casting votes decreases, the locations of the pivotal voters are likely to 
become more extreme and the size of the core to expand. In the case of exactly two-
thirds turnout, for example, the pivotal voters would be the extreme left and extreme 
right voters, and a constitutional bill could be passed only if it received unanimous 
approval from all deputies present and voting. The size of the core would not be 
affected, however, if all abstentions were strategic, i.e., if all deputies who failed to 
vote would have voted "no" if they had voted. As the rate of strategic abstention 
increases, of course, the core will expand less but will do so asymmetrically. One of 
the empirical issues to be subsequently addressed is to determine the extent to which 
abstentions in the RCPD were strategic. 
For present purposes, however, we proceed by assuming that all deputies were 
equally likely to abstain on all votes at a rate equal to the average abstention rate in 
that Congress, i.e., 20 percent in the Fourth Congress and 24 percent in the Sixth. It 
would be risky, though, for the Speaker to act on the basis of average turnout; half the 
time turnout would be lower than that, and the pivotal voters consequently located 
21 
at more extreme positions. Proposals made by the Speaker under the assumption 
of average turnout, however, could frequently fall short of approval, risking the pos-
sibility of alternative proposals that would make him worse off. We thus make the 
additional assumptions that turnout was normally distributed, and that the Speaker's 
proposal strategy was premised on a "reliable" rate of turnout one standard deviation 
less than average. Locations of the pivotal voters under the assumptions of average 
and reliable turnout are also presented in Table 2. 
As the table entries indicate, pivotal voter locations are more extreme under the 
reliable turnout assumption, but by a surprisingly small amount. The reason why 
their locations covary so little with turnout is because the voters we identify as pivotal 
are surrounded by large clusters of deputies with very similar NOMINATE scores. 
Referring back to Figure 3, we see that the peaks of the bimodal (reformist vs. anti-
reformist) distribution that characterizes NOMINATE scores in the Fourth Congress 
were at about -.5 and +.5-exactly where we place the locations of the one-third 
and two-thirds pivotal voters. In the Sixth Congress NOMINATE scores describe 
a unimodal distribution, but there are still heavy concentrations of deputies in the 
neighborhoods of the pivotal voters. 
We now come to the last set of parameters to be determined-the location of the 
status quo points in votes taken on constitutional matters. As indicated earlier, for 
each roll call, NOMINATE estimates locations of the two alternatives paired against 
each other (as well as the cutpoint located midway between them). Unlike estimates 
of deputy ideal points, however, estimates of the vote parameters are not normalized. 
The manner in which they are calculated is also considerably different.12 We thus 
adopted a conservative strategy and use the NOMINATE status quo estimates only 
to determine on which side of the core the status quo was located. 
According to these data, 20 of the 21 constitutional bills approved by the Fourth 
Congress had status quo points located to the right of the core, as did 27 of the 41 
votes taken in the Sixth. These findings are hardly surprising, given that almost all 
B 0 's were provisions of the Brezhnev-Era Constitution of 1978. As all bills under 
consideration here· had been approved by the RCPD, none of the status quos were 
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located inside the core. By far the most frequent configuration present in the RCPD 
data, then, is consistent with the situation portrayed in Figure 2, with the Speaker's 
ideal point located in the left side of the core and the status quo to the right. 
In short, the NOMINATE scores tell us that in both the Fourth and Sixth Con-
gresses a relatively pro-reform Speaker typically confronted a status quo located far 
to the right, and thus a pivotal voter located squarely in the ranks of the opponents 
of reform. As can be seen by referring back to Figure 2, exactly what the Speaker 
can do and what he can accomplish in this situation depends upon the location of his 
ideal point relative to the indifference point of the pivotal voter. Unfortunately, the 
pivotal voter's indifference point is not something that we can observe. 
In a manner that is consistent with what Romer and Rosenthal assume in their 
model, we assume here that the Speaker's ideal point is to the left of the two-thirds 
pivotal voter. 13 We think that this assumption is a safe one, primarily because the 
RCPD, whose members ranged from radical free-market supporters of shock ther-
apy to unapologetic proponents of soviet communism, spanned as much ideological 
distance than any legislature in history. For it to be otherwise would require the 
two-thirds pivotal voter, comfortably ensconced in either the Agrarian or Commu-
nist fractions of the RCPD with a NOMINATE score of .5, to be so dissatisfied with 
the articles of the 1978 Constitution that he would prefer instead the policy platform 
of Democratic Russia. If this were the case, the path of reform legislation in the 
RCPD would have been far more felicitous than proved to be the case. 
In the minority of cases in which the status quo is on the left, the analogous 
assumption that the Speaker's ideal point is to the right of the one-third pivotal 
voter is more problematic. This is due, of course, to the fact that the ideal points of 
both Yeltsin and Khasbulatov were considerably closer to the one-third pivotal voter 
than to the two-thirds pivotal voter. As a result, the Speaker may have been able to 
obtain his ideal point without having to drive the one-third pivotal voter all the way 
to his indifference point. In the analyses to follow we will thus consider separately 
the situations in which the status quo was on the left from the situations when it was 
on the right. 
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As in Niskanen (1971), Romer and Rosenthal (1979), and other setter models, 
then, in most cases the key to the Speaker's strategy was to make a proposal that the 
pivotal voter just barely preferred to the reversionary status quo. This leads directly 
to some additional testable propositions. As indicated earlier, pitting a proposal 
against the status quo produces a cutpoint that divides the supporters of the proposal 
from its opponents. If the Speaker does succeed in making a proposal that the pivotal 
voter just barely prefers to the status quo, the number of deputies on the "approve" 
side of the cutpoint should be equal to the minimum (two-thirds of the membership) 
required for passage. In the case of negative status quos, of course, this may not have 
been the case. As indicated earlier, in such situations the Speaker may have been 
able to obtain his ideal point, and would not need to drive the pivotal voter all the 
way to his indifference point. If so, approval margins would be larger for bills with 
(negative) status quos on the left than with (positive) status quos on the right. 
An analysis of vote margins, however, is only partially informative. Minimal 
winning margins could be constituted by patterns of roll call voting quite different 
than that predicted by the model, i.e., that everyone on one side of the cutpoint votes 
for the bill and everyone on the other side votes against it. Bills could be approved, for 
example, by ad hoc majorities cobbled together across the entire ideological spectrum 
of the Congress. Another implication of the model, then, is that proposals that the 
pivotal voter just barely prefers to the status quo create cutpoints that are at the very 
edge of the core. As in the case of vote margins, when the status quo was negative the 
Speaker may not have had to "hardball" the pivotal voter to obtain his most preferred 
outcome. If so, cutpoints for bills with negative status quos would be farther away 
from the edge of the core and closer to the extreme than the cutpoints for bills with 
positive status quos. 
The NOMINATE procedure estimates cutpoints for every vote that is scaled, so 
this hypothesis can be readily tested. In reality, of course, roll call data in the Rus-
sian Congress, as in the the U.S. Congress, do not conform to the idealized pattern 
predicted by the formal model. More specifically, the cutpoints estimated by NOM-
INATE do not precisely cleave the distribution into two opposing camps; on every 
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vote there are deputies on each side of the cutpoint that vote in the direction opposite 
to that predicted. It remains the case, however, that the cutpoint that is estimated is 
the best prediction possible as to where support for a bill starts and opposition ends. 
For the purposes of our analysis, this is sufficient. 
A final issue we need to confront before turning to the empirical tests of the Czar 
Rule model is the nature of the null hypothesis: in evaluating the empirical merits of 
the model, what is the standard that we are to hold it against? When we consider 
the major reasons why the model might perform poorly in accounting for the data, 
we think the most compelling alternative is that outcomes of the legislative process 
in the RCPD were driven by the pivotal voter and not by the Speaker. 
And there are many good reasons why the model might perform poorly. First, it 
may be that the Speaker was not able, as assumed by the Czar Rule model, to make 
credible, one-shot, "take it or leave it" offers to the pivotal voter. Consider once 
again the situations portrayed in Figures 1 and 2. Standing between the outcome 
desired by the Speaker and the reversionary status quo, the pivotal voter may well 
have reasoned that if he rejected the Speaker's initial proposal, the Speaker would 
counter with a better offer. As a consequence, the Speaker's initial proposal may have 
been somewhat farther away from his own ideal point and closer to the ideal point 
of the pivotal voter. If so, we would observe cutpoints that move out from the edge 
of the core and toward the extreme of the distribution of deputies' ideal points. We 
would also observe approval of the Speaker's proposals by over-size vote margins. 
Similarly, the Speaker could also have been uncertain about the distribution of 
preferences among the deputies. Fearful of suffering defeat in an unforgiving political 
environment, this uncertainty might have made him risk-averse. Proposals made 
to the Congress and the bills that were ultimately approved might thus have been 
farther from the ideal point of the Speaker, and closer to the ideal point of the pivotal 
voter, than the Czar Rule model would predict. As before, the consequence of this 
breakdown in a key assumption of the model would be cutpoints that move out from 
the edge of the core and toward the extreme of the distribution of deputies' ideal 
points, and approval by overly large vote margins. 
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Thirdly, it could be that the Presidium, and, by extension, the Supreme Soviet, 
were not the mere instruments of the Speaker's will that the Czar Rule model as-
sumes. The major theme in Remington, Davidheiser, and Smith's (1992) study of 
the Supreme Soviet is not one of deference to the Speaker, but rather of the great ef-
forts undertaken to achieve consensus in the RCPD. As before, our expectation about 
what would result from this breakdown of a key assumption is outcomes that favor the 
pivotal voter over the Speaker, overly large approval margins, and cutpoints located 
away from the edge of the core and out toward the extremes of the distribution. 
To quickly summarize, the Czar Rule model we have developed yields the following 
hypotheses: 
1. Any proposal that the Speaker puts forth to the Congress is in the core. The 
Congress should therefore accept all such proposals and reject any attempts to amend 
them. 
2. The key to the Speaker's strategy is to make proposals that the pivotal voter just 
barely prefers to the status quo. As a consequence, all bills should be approved by 
the minimum number of votes required. In the case of constitutional matters, this is 
two-thirds of the entire membership. 
3. If the Speaker makes a proposals that the pivotal voter just barely prefers to the 
status quo, the cutpoint should be at the very left edge of the core if the status quo is 
on the (reformist) left and on the right edge if the status quo is on the (anti-reformist) 
right. 
Amendment Activity 
To test our first hypothesis, we need to ascertain the frequency and fate of amend-
ments posed against bills introduced by the Speaker. To reiterate, all bills introduced 
by the Speaker should lay in the core, implying that they should all pass and that all 
attempts to amend them should fail. Table 3 reports the number of bills introduced, 
the number that were approved, the number of amendments offered by deputies, and 
the fate of these amendments for the Fourth and Sixth Congress, respectively . 
. i 
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Table 3 about here 
According to the entries in this table, almost all constitutional bills introduced by 
the Speaker to the RCPD were ultimately approved. Before doing so, however, the 
Fourth considered over one hundred amendments to these bills. Most were rejected, 
but nearly every bill was subject to at least one amendment attempt and about half 
(11 of 24) were in fact amended prior to final approval. Three of these bills picked 
up multiple amendments. Data from Khasbulatov's Sixth Congress are somewhat 
different. The RCPD considered more than twice as many constitutional bills, but 
fewer than half of these bills were subject to an amendment. Over two-thirds were 
approved in the same form in which they had been introduced. 
Not all amendment attempts, however, were equally likely to succeed. As indicated 
earlier, the Editorial Committee of the RCPD was responsible for preparing the final 
text of bills, and in so doing could offer final amendments. As the entries in Table 4 
indicate, amendments offered by this committee were approved virtually every time. 
In contrast, those sponsored by individual deputies (who, in many cases, were acting 
on behalf of a group or fraction) were almost always rejected. 
Table 4 about here 
The Editorial Committee's success rate was no doubt inflated by the fact that 
in some cases the amendments they reported were innocu_gus, technical changes to 
the language of the bill. This was particularly true in the Fourth Congress; the 
most consequential of the Editorial Committee's amendments adopted in this session 
was one that extended the President's immunity from criminal prosecution to the 
Vice-President. Editorial changes were clearly more substantive, however, under the 
"streamlined" procedures employed by Khasbulatov in the Sixth Congress. In the 
Fourth Congress, Editorial Committee amendments were considered prior to a final 
vote on the bill as a whole, i.e., the bill (either amended or not, versus the status 
quo). This is in keeping with parliamentary practice in most Western legislatures. In 
the Sixth Congress, however, Editorial Committee amendments were introduced and 
considered only after a vote to accept the bill as a whole had failed. At that time 
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Khasbulatov would subject the bill as amended by the Editorial Committee to a final 
vote, rather than hold an initial vote on the amendment(s) followed by a vote on the 
bill. This procedure was employed 19 times during the Sixth Congress, and resulted 
in the approval of 14 bills that had previously been rejected. 
That any bills failed and that any amendments were approved by the RCPD 
obviously P<?Ses serious problems for the Czar Rule model; the predictions were that 
all bills should have been accepted, not just most of them, and that all amendments 
should have failed, not just most of them. On the other hand, the data on successful 
amendment activity is not necessarily all that damaging if the Speaker orchestrates 
this activity. The fact that amendments rarely passed without the sponsorship of the 
Editorial Committee suggests that this was the case, particularly given the closed 
rule procedures Khasbulatov invoked in the Sixth Congress for consideration of the 
amended bills that it reported. 
What we make of these data, then, depends heavily upon what we make of the 
Editorial Committee. Analysis of their roll call voting records shows that the Com-
mittee was ideologically quite representative of the RCPD as a whole. As in the case 
of committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet, however, all members of the 
Editorial Committee were named by the Speaker, and were generally seen by RCPD 
deputies as acting as agents of the Speaker. We will return to the matter of Editorial 
Committee amendments at a later juncture. For now, though, support afforded to 
the Czar Rule model by the data on amendment activity is partial and uneven at 
best. 
Roll Call Vote Margins 
Our second hypothesis about Czar Rule is that all bills were approved by the minimum 
number of votes required. This is based on the assumption that the pairing of any 
proposal against the status quo produces a cutpoint, and that all deputies on one 
side of the cutpoint vote for the bill while all those on the other side vote against it. 
Making the pivotal voter indifferent between the bill and status quo thus implies that 
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the bill will pass with no margin to spare. Because of attrition, the total number of 
deputies in the Fourth and Sixth Congresses were 1064 and 1050, respectively, which 
means that the actual number of votes required to approve constitutional matters 
were 708 in the Fourth and 700 in the Sixth.14 
As indicated above, in the Sixth Congress 14 bills that were initially rejected by 
the RCPD eventually passed after being amended. As Romer, and Rosenthal, and 
Ladha (1984) point out, in rejecting a proposal voters necessarily reveal information 
about the distribution of their preferences and about turnout. An agenda setter can 
presumably use this information to better gauge the location of the pivotal voter's 
indifference point and to thus obtain more preferred outcomes. If this is the case, 
we would predict approval margins to be smaller for the 14 (amended) bills that had 
previously been rejected. Table 5 thus divides bills from the Sixth Congress into two 
cate~ories: 1) those that were approved by the RCPD without amendment, and 2) 
those that initially failed but that were subsequently amended and approved. 
Table 5 about here 
As the data in this table indicate, only 2 of the 21 constitutional bills approved in 
the Fourth Congress passed with approval margins under 70 percent. Most, in fact, 
garnered margins of over 76 percent, which is about a hundred votes, or 10 percent 
of the entire corps of deputies, more than necessary. Figures for bills in the Sixth 
Congress that were unamended by the Editorial Committee were similar. Only 10 of 
41 passed with less than 70 percent support, and over half exceeded the 76 percent 
support level. We had also speculated that because the two Speakers' ideal points 
were on the reformist side of the spectrum that approval margins might be larger 
for bills with (negative) status quos on the left than with (positive) status quos on 
the right. The small number of bills with status quos makes it hard to make reliable 
comparisons, but we found no evidence of assymetry. The average approval margin 
for bills with negative status quos was almost identical to that for bills with positive 
status quos. 
Overall, these results imply that Speakers Yeltsin and Khasbulatov did not achieve 
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outcomes that the pivotal voter just barely preferred to the status quo. We cannot 
tell at this point why Speakers and Yeltsin brought forth bills that passed by such 
large margins. Whatever the case, the oversized majorities by which these bills passed 
suggest that the Speakers were not obtaining outcomes that were as close to their 
ideal points as the Czar Rule model would predict. 
The entries in Table 5 also reveal the true impact of the requirement that con-
stitution bills receive the approval of two-thirds of the entire membership. In the 
Fourth Congress the number of nonvoting deputies on constitutional bills averaged 
213, or about 20 percent of the membership. In the Sixth Congress the number was 
251, or about 24 percent. Because of these high rates of nonvoting, constitutional 
bills approved in these Congresses generally received the support of over 90 percent 
of the deputies who were present and voting. Even bills that passed by a bare min-
imum were supported by over 80 percent of the deputies who were there to cast a 
vote. There is, then, a strong rationale for what Remington, Smith, and Davidheiser 
(1992) report to be the Supreme Soviet's tendency to craft proposals supported by 
large, lopsided majorities: for a constitutional bill to be adopted by those deputies of 
the RCPD who were present and voting, the majority needed to be large and lopsided! 
Finally, vote figures reported in the third column of Table 5 support the hypoth-
esis that the Speaker in the Sixth Congress, Khasbulatov, was extracting relevant 
information from the cases in which the RCPD failed to approve a bill that had been 
presented to them. Seven of the fourteen bills that were saved by amendments fol-
lowing their initial rejection by the RCPD passed with margins under 70 percent. On 
average, these 14 bills received approval from an average of 753 deputies, or by only 
five percent more of the membership than that required by the two-thirds criterion. 
These approval margins were only about half the size of those by which the bills that 
were initially successful, and lend support to Romer, Rosenthal, and Ladha's (1984) 
conjecture. Except for this evidence of an agenda-setting Speaker learning from re-
jected initial offers, however, our findings concerning vote margins are not supportive 
of the Czar Rule model. 
Because approval thresholds in the RCPD were based upon the total membership, 
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not voting, as we have previously observed, was equivalent to voting "no." In order to 
determine the extent to which deputies who opposed a bill availed themselves of the 
strategy of simply failing to vote, we divided the membership into three categories on 
the basis of their NOMINATE scores-those to the left of the "reliable" core, those 
to the right, and those in the middle-and cross-tabulated them with their votes, 
which were either "yes," "no," or not voting. If abstentions were strategic rather 
than random, we should observe the abstention rate to be markedly higher among 
that group of deputies (on either the left or the right) that also tended to vote "no." 
Looking at all the constitutional roll call votes in the Sixth Congress, we found 
the strong correlation we were looking for between voting "no" and abstaining in 
about half the cases. On some votes a large majority of nonsupportive votes were 
in fact abstentions. On the other hand, in about half the cases the abstention rate 
varied little with the pattern of "yes" and "no" votes. We were not able to make any 
headway in discerning why deputies sometimes chose to vote "no" and sometimes 
chose to abstain. Pro-reform deputies were just as likely as anti-reform deputies to 
strategically abstain. Moreover, nothing in the substance of the bills provided any 
clues as to why deputies chose to do one thing or the other. At this point we can 
only suggest that this question certainly is worthy of additional research. 
Cutpoint Locations 
Our third set of analyses pertain to the locations of the cutpoints of bills approved 
by the RCPD. To reiterate, because the status quos in our dataset are all located to 
the extreme right or to the extreme left, the key to the Speaker's strategy is to make 
the pivotal voter indifferent between the bill that he proposes and the status quo. If 
the Speaker succeeds in doing so, the cutpoint on the vote would be located at the 
edge of the core (the right edge if the status quo is to the right, the left edge if it is to 
the left). If, on the other hand, we observe cutpoints out toward the extremes of the 
distribution, the implication is the same as in our analysis of vote margins-that the 
outcomes are more favorable to the pivotal voter, and less favorable to the Speaker, 
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than posited by the Czar Rule model. We should not, of course, observe any cutpoint 
locations within the core, as this implies the bill could not muster the two-thirds 
margin of support required for passage. 
Locations of cutpoints for the constitutional bills approved by the Fourth and 
Sixth Congresses, as estimated by the NOMINATE procedure, are reported in Table 
6. As previously, we report separately the cutpoint locations of the 14 bills that, 
in the Sixth Congress, initially failed but subsequently passed after being amended 
by the Editorial Committee. In all instances, all bills with negative cutpoints were 
associated with status quos on the left, and all positive cutpoints, with status quos 
on the right. 
Table 6 about here 
As the entries here indicate, cutpoints for some of the constitutional bills approved 
by the RCPD were, as posited by the Czar Rule model, located at the edges of the 
core. 15 Most, however, are instead far out at the extremes. In the Sixth Congress, 
nearly half had cutpoints more extreme than .9 or -.9. This was also the case for 16 
of the 21 bills approved during the Fourth Congress. Consistent with the ·previous 
analysis of approval margins, there is also no evidence to support our conjecture that 
bills with negative status quos would have more extreme cutpoints. Although there 
are too few of them to say anything definitive, the .entries in Table 6 suggest that, 
if anything, the cutpoints for bills with negative status quos were less extreme, not 
more. Also consistent with the previous analysis o'f... vote margins is the fact that 
the substitute bills that came out of the Editorial Committee in the Sixth Congress 
tended to have cutpoints located closer to the edges of the core than those of other 
bills. As before, this suggests that Khasbulatov was able to use information from 
the votes on failed bills to obtain more preferred outcomes. All in all, though, the 
conclusion we must draw from these findings is the same we drew from our analysis 
of vote margins. Constitutional bills approved by the RCPD were less favorable to 




As indicated earlier, the substantial amount of amendment activity that occurred 
in the RCPD was difficult to assess; that any occurred was contrary to the predictions 
of the Czar Rule model, but almost all successful amendments were sponsored by the 
Editorial Committee-a group widely regarded as a tool of the Speaker. We now take 
another, closer look at Editorial Committee amendments by comparing the cutpoints 
for the bills that were approved after being amended by the Committee with the 
cutpoints of the previously failed bills that they replaced. As the entries ill Table 
7 reveal, in every case the effect of Editorial Committee amendments was to move 
the cutpoint from a relatively moderate, interior position to a more extreme one. 
What this means is that Committee amendments produced outcomes that were more 
palatable to the pivotal voter and, necessarily, less to the liking of the Speaker, than 
the bill that was initially proposed. 
Table 7 about here 
In laying out the model we had suggested several reasons why the Speaker might 
have made proposals that were farther away from his own ideal point and closer to 
that of the pivotal voter than the Czar Rule model would predict. At this juncture, 
however, none of these factors are very compelling explanations for the data. Above 
all, the consequences of failing to secure passage of a bill do not appear to be dire 
enough to justify much risk aversion. The rules gave the Speaker great leverage over 
the amendment process. Our findings, furthermore, indicate that constitutional bills 
that were amended by the Editorial Committee after failing initially probably drove 
the pivotal voter closer to his indifference point than the bills that were accepted 
without amendment. Nor does uncertainty seem to have played an important role in 
the Speaker's strategy. The hundreds of roll calls taken in the RCPD should have 
revealed most information about preferences, and what variation there was in turnout 
had little impact upon the location of the pivotal voters. 
What, then, was the major impediment to Czar Rule in the RCPD? We think 
that it was the same factor, ironically, that made turnout matter so little-the large 
cluster of deputies with extremely similar NOMINATE scores in proximity to the 
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pivotal voter. Similar NOMINATE scores result from having similar voting records. 
It is thus much more accurate to speak of large, pivotal blocs than of individual 
pivotal voters. Most of the time it was simply not feasible for the Speaker to obtain 
the support of the pivotal voter for a measure without also bringing along several 
dozen other votes in excess of the number required. As a consequence, the key 
strategy ascribed to the Speaker by the Czar Rule model (making proposals that the 
pivotal voter just barely preferred to the status quo) was difficult to carry out. 
It is likely that the nature of the constitutional legislation that was at stake in the 
RCPD further degraded the Speaker's ability to "fine tune" proposals. Romer and 
Rosenthal's setter model was developed in the context of referenda on local school 
district funding. In such a context the agenda-setter can make very fine gradations 
in presenting proposals, e.g., between a tax rate of 40 mills versus 45. In contrast, 
the constitutional questions considered by the RCPD included such issues as what 
to call the country, how much power of review to grant to the constitutional court, 
and whether or not to allow young men eligible for the draft to become conscientious 
objectors. Such issues make for an issue space that is quite lumpy and discrete. 
Conclusion 
Was the Russian Congress of People's Deputies characterized by Czar Rule? The 
structure of the RCPD and the rule governing its deliberations certainly made this 
a live possibility. The Speaker of the RCPD was simultaneously Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet and of the Presidium, the "inner parliaments" from which came 
proposals to amend the constitution and most other major legislation. Passage of 
constitutional matters required approval by two-thirds of the elected membership, 
and, most importantly, amendments to bills accepted "as background" required the 
same supermajority. These rules put the initial proposals presented by the Speaker 
to the RCPD in an especially privileged position. After bills were presented to the 
RCPD, the Speaker collected all proposed amendments, determined the order in which 
they would be considered, and could call for a final vote at any time. In conjunction 
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with his use of the Editorial Committee, this provided considerable assurance to the 
Speaker that the amendment process would not veer out of control. 
The model of Czar Rule we developed derives some support from the fact that 
most constitutional proposals introduced by the Speaker were adopted by the RCPD 
without amendment, and from the fact that virtually all amendments that were ap-
proved by the RCPD originated with the Editorial Committee. On the other hand, 
the overly large margins by which they were adopted, as well as the extreme loca-
tion of the cutpoints, are indicative of outcomes that are much more favorable to 
the pivotal voter, and less favorable to the Speaker, than predicted by the Czar Rule 
model. 
It is likely that several factors conspired to prevent the Speaker from taking greater 
advantage of his sweeping parliamentary powers. What we believe to be the major 
one, however, was the large cluster of deputies in the neighborhood of the pivotal 
voter-particularly the anti-reform two-thirds pivotal voter. The Speaker generally 
could not win the support of the pivotal voter without also gaining the assent of 
several dozen other deputies in excess of the number required for passage. This 
seriously undermined the Speaker's ability to make proposals that the pivotal voter 
just barely preferred to the status quo -the key element of Czar Rule. 
The real problem facing reformers in the RCPD, then, was not a dominating 
Speaker intent on undermining the Yeltsin presidency (though this may have been 
Khasbulatov's objective). It was instead the fact that in most cases the location of 
the status quo put the (two-thirds) pivotal voter squarely in the anti-reformist camp. 
Scammon and Wattenberg (1970) argue that great insight into American politics can 
be had by observing that the median voter is a white, 47-year-old wife of a machinist 
from the suburbs of Dayton, Ohio. By our reckoning, the two-thirds pivotal voter 
in the RCPD was a male, ethnic Russian, 56-year-old chairman of a large collective 
farm in Bryansk Oblast. And, as we have just argued, winning the assent of the 
pivotal voter usually required winning over several dozen other like-minded deputies. 
The struggle that took place in the RCPD, then, was not between personalities, 
nor the consequence of a serious flaw in constitutional design. It was instead a 
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battle over the fundamental direction of public policy in Russia. There was thus 
no reason to believe that the conflict between supporters and opponents of market-
oriented reforms would fade away with the demise of the RCPD, and indeed it has 
not. As documented by Remington and Smith (1994), voting patterns in the Duma, 
the successor to the RCPD, display the same division between those favoring and 
those opposing continuing political and economic reforms. 
Finally, our findings concerning the RCPD are consistent with those of Jones' 
(1968) regarding the nature of Czar Rule in the late nineteenth-century U.S. Congress. 
He concludes that the putative power of Boss Reed rested not upon the factors to 
which it was generally attributed-his mastery of parliamentarianism, his rapier wit, 
or his commanding physical presence. It rested instead upon the reliable backing of 
a large, cohesive Republican majority. When that majority disappeared, so did Czar 
Rule. 
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Table 1: Ideological Tendencies of Fractions 
in the Sixth Congress 
Fraction Average Average Factor No 
NOMINATE Analysis Confidence 
Scores Scores Vote 
Radical Democrats -.45 -1.2 -86 
Democratic Russia -.23 -1.1 -74 
Non-party Members -.16 -1.1 -68 
Left Center -.16 -0.8 -71 
Freedom Russia -.09 -0.6 -61 
Union of Russian Workers .01 -0.7 -22 
Civic Society .05 -0.8 
New Generation .16 -0.7 -20 
Industrial Union .20 0.3 +1 
Sovereignty and Equality .20 0.6 -13 
Russia .35 0.6 +52 
Agrarian Union .39 0.8 +72 
Homeland .39 1.0 +62 
Communists of Russia .54 1.0 +80 
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Table 2: Location of Key Actors' Ideal Points 
Congress Fourth Sixth 
Speaker -.39 -.17 
Pivotal voters ("average" turnout) -.50, .45 -.29, .50 





Table 3: Consideration of Constitutional Bills in the RCPD 
Fourth Congress Sixth Congress 
Constitutional Bills Introduced 24 60 
Bills Subject to Amendment 22 28 
Bills Successfully Amended 11 18 
Number of Amendments 112 75 
Number of Successful Amendments 15 23 
Bills Approved-···- .. 21 55 
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Table 4: Fate of Amendments to Constitutional Bills 
Congress Fourth Sixth 
Amendments Sponsored By Deputees 100 57 
Number Successful 3 6 
Amendments Sponsored By the Editorial Committee 12 18 
Number Successful 12 17 
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Table 5: Approval Margins for Constitutional Bills 
Fourth Congress Sixth Congress Sixth Congress (EC) 
Percentage of 
Total Membership 
::; 70 2 10 7 
71-75 6 10 5 
76-80 11 18 2 
81-90 2 3 0 
Total 21 41 14 
Percentage of 
Deputies Present 
::; 80 0 0 0 
81-85 0 4 4 
86-90 6 7 4 
91-95 11 24 6 
96-100 4 6 0 
Total 21 41 14 
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Table 6: Location of Cutpoints on Votes on Constitutional Bills 
Outpoint Location Fourth Congress Sixth Congress Sixth Congress (EC) 
-1.00, ... ,-.90 1 1 0 
-.89, ... ,-.80 0 0 0 
-.79, ... ,-.70 0 2 0 
-.69, ... ,-.60 0 1 2 
-.59, ... ,-.50 0 3 1 
-.49, ... ,-.40 0 2 1 
-.39, ... ,-.30 0 1 0 
-.29, ... ,-.20 0 0 0 
-.19, ... ,-.10 0 0 0 
-.09, ... ,.00 0 0 0 
.01, ... ,.10 0 0 0 
.11, ... ,.20 0 0 0 
.21, ... ,.30 0 0 0 
.31, ... ,.40 0 0 0 
.41, ... ,.50 0 0 0 
.51, ... ,.60 1 1 1 
.61, ... ,.70 1 3 3 
.71, ... ,.80 2 5 2 
.81, ... ,.90 1 3 2 
.. 91, ... ,1.00 15 19 2 
Total 21 41 14 
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Table 7: The Effect of Editorial Committee Behavior 
in the Sixth Congress 
Bill Number Outpoint, Failed Bill Outpoint, Accepted Bill 
1 .33 .86 
2 -.29 -.68 
3 .40 .61 
4 -.14 -.60 
5 .51,.49 1.00 
6 -.31 -.47 
7 .06 -.55 
8 .44 .57 
9 .24 .72 
10 .28,.26 61 
11 .07,.49 .96 
12 .48 .75 
13 .49 .67 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Chapter 3 The Russian Electorate 
Between 1991 and 1995 
Introduction 
The results of Russia's December 1993 parliamentary election, judged by most ob-
servers as an upset victory for the ultra-nationalist party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and 
of the December 1995 contest in which Communists gained the upper hand in the 
State Duma, prompted a good deal of speculation about the stability of the Russian 
electorate, its commitment to reform, and the viability of Russia's infant democratic 
institutions. Indeed, it seemed inconceivable that four years or so of declining eco-
nomic output and life expectancy, rising crime, and a civil war in the Caucasus would 
leave people as hospitable to reform as they appeared to be in 1991 when Boris 
Yeltsin first ascended to the presidency. The chief concern is that electoral trends 
signal a fundamental shift in attitudes away from the euphoria of the late 1980's and 
early 1990's so that, in the likely event that the Russian economy experiences only a 
gradual and painful ascent that leaves much of the population impoverished for the 
foreseeable future and that the war in the Caucasus must necessarily entail increased 
sacrifice and cost, any optimism about the future of Russian democracy and reform 
seems wholly inappropriate. 
Of course, we cannot discount the possibility that vote counts are seriously con-
taminated as a rule by widespread fraud (Myagkov and Sobyanin 1995). After all, 
Russian democracy is a mere five years old, and Stalinist rules for administering 
elections still apply in many regions; how else do we explain turnout rates in some 
conservative and remote voting districts that remain above 95 percent? Nor should we 
discount the possibility that Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov's successes derived as much 
from superior campaign tactics and an ability to appeal to voter aspirations as from 
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any disenchantment with reform and democracy. We suspect, in fact, that Gaidar as 
poster boy of a party with the platform of "macro-economic stability" would hardly 
attract voters in the West any more than he captured the imagination of Russia's 
electorate; nor should we suppose that the image of Viktor Chernomyrdin promising, 
in effect, more of the same, would inspire voters in any electorate. However, it is folly 
to assume that those returns contain no information about preferences, that they are 
wholly contaminated by fraud, or that they are the mere consequence of campaign 
rhetoric. They are, after all, largely consistent with objective economic circumstances. 
Here, then, abiding by the same assumption made implicitly by those who offer their 
assessments of the ebb and fl.ow of Russian democracy, we treat election statistics at 
face value. 
The questions we address here, moreover, are not much different from the ones that 
concern earlier analyses. We ask whether a significant part of the Russian electorate is 
growing weary of Yeltsin, democracy and reform and whether there is evidence that 
the electorate is becoming increasingly polarized between reform and anti-reform 
positions. We want to know what share of those who stayed the course of reform 
through December 1993 (by voting either for, say, Gaidar or Yavlinsky), changed 
their opinions and voted Communist in 1995. We address the issue of the extent to 
which reformers damaged their electoral prospects more than Communists in 1995 by 
failing to unify under the banner of a single candidate. And we ask whether Yeltsin's 
'party of power,' Our Home Is Russia, succeed in attracting voters from the center 
or whether it secured its 11 percent of the vote in 1995 primarily at the expense of 
those parties that championed reform in 1993. 
We understand that answers to such questions are, in principle at least, best 
learned from public opinion polls and in-depth surveys of people's attitudes and per-
ceptions. Unfortunately, the usual problems associated with polling - sampling error, 
respondents unwilling to admit they didn't vote or that they voted for a loser, and an 
electorate uncertain of its preferences - are multiplied in Russia by the inaccessibility 
of significant parts of the electorate (those in remote rural regions), the non-existence 
of panel surveys extending across two or more elections, the uncertainties inherent 
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in an unstable multiparty system in which few voters are familiar with all but a 
small handful of parties, and by respondents who often seem more inclined to answer 
"don't know" than to give any other response. Unsurprisingly, then, most analyses 
of electoral trends as well as nearly all journalistic interpretations of events are based 
on official aggregate election returns and, with respect to the parliamentary contests, 
on the share of Duma seats won by one party's list or another. In this respect, per-
haps the most thoughtful assessment of electoral trends is McFaul's (1996) recent 
analysis in which he concludes that although there are no radical shifts from left to 
right or vice-versa within the electorate, Russian voters are becoming increasingly 
and dangerously polarized between reform and anti-reform positions. 
McFaul's analysis is in fact the starting point for our own, and so we summarize 
it here in the form of a set of testable hypotheses, the most important of which are 
the following: 
Hl: "despite the presence of 43 parties [in December 1995] ... Russian party politics 
is still essentially bipolar" (p. 94). 
H2: "there has been little change in the balance of support between [reform and 
anti-reform] camps" (p. 94). 
H3: "the 1995 results do not signal a radical shift away from Zhirinovsky-style 'na-
tionalism' and a strong move toward 'communism"' (p. 94). 
H4: "many centrist voters from 1993 voted for the q_pposition in 1995 ... [but] "the 
core opposition parties from 1993 (Communists, LDPR, and Agrarians) did not 
benefit from this centrist migration ... 'new' votes for the opposition parties 
went to ... radical communists [Anpilov] and the new nationalist parties like 
Alexandr Le bed's CRC, Alexandr Rutskoi's Derzhava, and Power to the People" 
(p. 95). 
H5: "the opposition received a big boost from the return of the three million radical 
communist voters who had mostly boycotted the 1993 elections ... [and] voted 





H6: The success of Our Home Is Russia "came at the expense of [Russia's Choice]" 
(p. 98). 
H7: "Party proliferation within the reformist camp ... dramatically weakened the 
representation of reformists within the Duma" (p. 98). 
Like previous assessments, McFaul's analysis and these seven hypotheses are based 
primarily on an informed assessment of national aggregate returns and, with the ex-
ception of hypothesis H5, on the breakdown of support among those who voted. In 
a sense, then, these seven hypotheses are based on but two observations - the na-
tional aggregate results of the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections. Unfortunately, 
elections returns at this level of aggregation cannot provide sufficient data for defini-
tive conclusions: there are too many variables (possible shifts in voter loyalties) and 
too few observations (percentages of the vote received by the different parties). Put 
simply, there is an inherent mathematical indeterminacy in the results. This is not 
to say that McFaul's scenario is incorrect, but only that it is not the only possibility 
consistent with aggregate national returns. In this essay, then, we reconsider these 
hypotheses using data aggregated only to the level of individual rayons drawn from 
all Russian elections since 1991. Since we are thereby able to operate with as many 
as approximately 2,000 observations 1 per election, we can reduce considerably the 
number of logically admissible scenarios. 
An additional problem with most interpretations of official returns is that conclu-
sions typically rely on a classification of parties into reform, anti-reform, and centrist 
blocks. Unfortunately, parties and candidates do not come with ready-made reformist 
and anti-reformist labels, and the details of any such classification can be manipu-
lated to admit a variety of alternative conclusions. For example, how do we classify, 
say, Women of Russia in 1993 and 1995? If we look at the legislative voting records 
of Duma deputies elected under their list and classify the party as centrist, we still do 
not know if this is the view voters held of them, nor will national aggregate returns 
tell us who secured the votes they lost in 1995. Should we classify Shakrai's Party 
1The numbers of observations vary from 1003 for the 1993 elections to 2195 for the 1995 elections. 
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of Unity and Accord as reformist or centrist? Although Shakrai himself is associated 
with reform, several deputies elected under his party's label in 1993 ran unsuccess-
fully on Rybkin's stillborn party list in 1995, which was originally intended to appeal 
to right-of-center voters. Although we might agree that Our Home Is Russia belongs 
in the same category as Russia's Choice since each, in their time, drew largely upon 
Yeltsin's presidential resources, can we safely assume that each secured their votes 
from the same pool of voters or did Our Home Is Russia win a significant share of 
its votes from parties we might classify as centrist in 1993? And what do we do with 
the LDPR? Is it anti-reform or should we, on the basis of Zhirinovsky's legislative 
record of compromise, place it in its own category - pro-reform but anti-government? 
Of course, classification is required whenever we try to say whether the electorate 
is becoming more or less conservative. But here we focus on the source of support 
of the various parties, candidates and referenda options that appeared on ballots so 
that any classifications we intended only to help interpret our more formal statistical 
analysis. 
Finally, answering questions about electoral stability and preference is complicated 
also by the fact that turnout and the percentage of invalid ballots varies greatly from 
one election to the next. Officially, turnout declined steadily from 1991 to December 
1993 (75.4 percent in March 1991, 74.7 percent in June 1991, 64.3 percent in April 
1993, and 54.8 percent in December 1993) but rose sharply again in December 1995 
to 63.2 percent. Similarly, the percentage of the electorate casting invalid or blank 
ballots when voting for party lists rose to 7.62 percent in December 1993, but declined 
to a historically more normal level (less than two percent) in 1995. Who cast invalid 
ballots in 1993, who lost votes as turnout declined, and who gained them in 1995 
when turnout reversed its trend? More importantly, is there evidence that parts of 
the electorate are becoming increasingly disenchanted with reform and Yeltsin but, 
instead of shifting directly from pro-reform to anti-reform positions, the disenchanted 
first become indifferent to all parties and positions and register their dissatisfaction 
by staying home? Thus, rather than ignore variations in turnout and the number 
of invalid ballots, here we examine closely who failed to vote or voted improperly in 
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1993 and who returned to the polls in 1995. 
Thus, using data more disaggregated than was available to earlier analysts, im-
posing no specific classification of parties, and accommodating changes in turnout, 
this essay offers a reconsideration of McFaul's seven hypotheses and the general sce-
nario he offers as a description of the Russian electorate. Briefly, we sustain the first 
hypothesis concerning the stability of that electorate and conclude that if there is any 
instability it lies in two places: in the vote Zhirinovsky received in 1993, a significant 
share of which supported reformist positions in 1991 and April 1993, and which (in 
accordance with hypothesis H4) moved to support communist parties in 1995; and in 
the changing patterns of non-voting and invalid ballots. Although the data supports 
Hypothesis H5 that Anpilov's party gained from increased turnout in 1995, it also 
reveals that the Communist Party was the biggest net beneficiary. And although we 
agree in part with hypothesis H6 that many of the lost votes of Russia's Choice went 
to Our Home Is Russia and, in accordance with H7, to other unsuccessful reformist 
parties, Our Home Is Russia gained as well from increased turnout, although not as 
much as the Communists. Trends in turnout also cause us to question hypothesis 
H2, in that between 1991 and December 1993, much of the votes lost to nonvoting 
came from reformist positions. The most curious and, perhaps, suspicious finding 
(at least with respect to allegations of fraud in December 1993) is that, rather than 
being spread uniformly across party lists, virtually all voters who cast invalid ballots 
in 1993 voted in 1995 for the Communist Party, the LDPR, and Our Home Is Russia. 
In reaching these conclusions and in offering other refinements of hypotheses Hl 
through H7, this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief history 
of the elections that concern us, describes our data, and discusses our methodology. 
Section 3 discusses our primary results about the movement of voters for three pairs of 
elections: June 1991 (the first presidential contest) versus the April 1993 referendum, 
April 1993 versus the December 1993 parliamentary election, and December 1993 
versus December 1995. To gain a better overview of the electorate across Yeltsin's 
tenure in office, Section 4 considers two non-adjacent pairs of elections - the flow 
of votes between 1991 and December 1993 and between 1991 and December 1995 -
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and concludes with an examination of potential differences between urban and rural 
voters. 
History, Data, and Methods 
Before describing our data it is useful to first summarize the basic changes that oc-
curred across the four elections that concern us - the June 1991 presidential election, 
the April 1993 referendum, the December 1993 parliamentary election and consti-
tutional referendum, and the December 1995 parliamentary election. Briefly, the 
June 1991 election was the first popular balloting for president in Russian history, 
at which time the unique personality associated with reform and opposition to the 
existing regime was Boris Yeltsin, then Speaker of the Russian Congress of People's 
Deputies. His opposite number was Nikolai Ryzhkov, the former USSR prime minis-
ter, who, as a nominee of the Communist Party, was widely viewed as a representative 
of the status quo. Zhirinovsky, in contrast, although positioning himself as an anti-
western ultra-nationalist, was not presumed to be opposed to reform or portrayed 
as a stand-in for any status quo. The remaining candidates were General Albert 
Makashov, USSR Minister of the Interior and future KGB director Vladimir Bakatin, 
and the communist governor of Kemerovo oblast, Aman Tuleev. Despite Bakatin's 
subsequent attempt to liberalize the KGB, all three of these candidates can be put 
into the anti-reformist camp, or at least the camp opposed to Yeltsin's then widely 
publicized opposition to the existing regime. Table 1 shows the results of this election 
and, with 45.6 million voters supporting Yeltsin, establishes the high water mark of 
his support, and, presumably, of enthusiasm for democratic market reform. 
The April 1993 referendum was called jointly by the President and the Congress 
of People's Deputies as part of their ongoing power struggle. Voters were asked four 
questions, three of which concerned confidence in Yeltsin and his economic policy, and 
the fourth asking about the advisability of holding early elections for a new Congress. 
Contrasting the outcome of the referendum (see Table 1), note first the sharp drop 
in turnout, from 74.7 percent to 64.2 percent. Second, although a clear majority 
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answers 'yes' to the first question on the ballot - the question most clearly directed 
at gauging confidence in Yeltsin - the absolute number of Yeltsin supporters declines 
from 45.6 million in 1991 to 40.4 million in 1993. Thus we can ask: did Yeltsin's 
'missing' 5.2 million voters defect to other, explicitly anti-reformist positions, or did 
they merely stay home and contribute to a growing pool of non-voters? 
The third measure of the electorate's mood occurred in December 1993. This 
election included a referendum on a new constitution as well as the choice of deputies 
to Russia's upper legislative chamber, the Federation Council. But because not only 
Yeltsin but Zhirinovsky urged voters to approve the constitution and because most 
candidates for the Council ran without party labels, perhaps the most interpretable 
assessment of voter preferences occurred with respect to the party-list voting to fill 
seats in the new State Duma. Table 1 summarizes the election outcome with respect to 
the 13 parties on the ballot as well as the number of votes cast against all parties, the 
number of invalid ballots, turnout, and the 'for' and 'against' vote on the constitution. 
Notice first that turnout continues its decline, from 64.3 percent in April to 54.8 
percent. Second, even if we classify only the Communist, Agrarian, and Zhirinovsky 
parties as explicitly 'anti-Yeltsin,' Yeltsin's support, like turnout, declines as well -
from 40.4 million voters in April to 34.1 million in December. However, confounding 
any simple assessment of who gained what from where is the fact that the number 
of voters who voted against Yeltsin in April and in support of the old Congress (the 
estimated 21.2 million who voted No on the first question and No on the fourth) far 
exceeds the number who supported the Communist or Agrarian parties (11.0 million) 
in December. Finally, we should also take note of the sharp increase in the number 
of invalid ballots - from L5 million to 4.4 million. Since turnout is declining as 
well, the question naturally arises about the political sympathies of these ostensibly 
incompetent or confused voters. 
Russia's most recent parliamentary election, in December 1995, offered voters a 
choice of 43 parties, and, with a significant cluster of ostensibly pro and anti-reform 
parties garnering votes in the three to five percent range, only four parties surpassed 
the five percent threshold and won seats on the party-list half of the contest (see 
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Table 1).1 The most notable 'success' was scored by the Communist party, which 
more than doubled the vote it and its fellow traveller, the Agrarians, received in 
1993. In contrast, Russia's Choice virtually disappeared from view and Zhirinovsky 
lost half of his support. But aside from these well publicized outcomes, we can find 
other patterns that warrant attention. First, turnout increases substantially, from 
54.8 percent to 64.4 percent, while the share of invalid ballots decreases to 'more 
normal' levels to 1.3 million ballots from 4.4 million in 1993. Second, although a 
new 'reform' or pro-government party appeared on the scene, Our Home Is Russia, 
and was credited with taking votes away from Russia's Choice, its vote share cannot 
account fully for the losses incurred by that party _and by those others we might 
classify as centrist in 1993, such as Women of Russia, Travkin's Democratic Russia, 
and Shakrai's Party of Unity and Accord. 
Finding meaningful trends in this electoral sequence is not difficult, but as we 
note earlier, the trends we find will depend on which parties we label pro-reform, 
anti-reform, and centrist. Thus, to better assess the mood of the electorate, we look 
instead at each party or candidate's source of support. Saying, for instance, that 
Russians are more anti-reform today than two or four years ago or that sfgnificant 
numbers are tiring of reform requires finding a measurable part of the electorate 
moving across the ideological spectrum from left to right. Similarly, the argument 
that Zhirinovsky's vote in 1993 was an anti-reform prc;>test vote that Yeltsin is unlikely 
to capture in the June 1996 presidential election requires explicit confirmation of the 
hypothesis that a predominant share of the votes ne,. lost in 1995 went to, say, the 
Communists. However, mere 'declassification' of parties cannot resolve matters; as 
we also indicate earlier, we must disaggregate our data. Here, then, we consider data 
aggregated only to the level of individual rayons. 
The Russian Federation consists of 89 semi-autonomous regions ( oblasts, krays, 
republics, autonomous regions, and the federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg), 
and each region, in turn, consists of a number of '~rayons." The average region has 
a population of about two million (exceptions are .the city of Moscow and some of 




of less than a hundred thousand. Typically, each region's capital is a large city 
with a population that ranges between several hundred thousands to several million 
and may itself consist of several rayons. The administrative capital of each rayon 
(excepting those that are part of a regional capital) is generally a small town with 
a population ranging from several thousand to several hundred thousand. There 
are, then, several alternative levels of aggregation of the data - rayon, region, Duma 
district (after December 1993) or the whole country - but until December 1995, 
the only official results were aggregated at the national level, whereas the Central 
Election Commission, following the December 1995 vote, published data at the rayon 
level. However, through a variety of sources (generally representatives of the Russia's 
Choice, who in most cases worked directly with local administration officials), we have 
obtained 'unofficial' returns aggregated at the rayon level for the first three elections 
in our study. Although not covering all of Russia, our data appears nevertheless to be 
representative of the whole in that no category of return varies from official numbers 
(national aggregate totals) by more than two percent. Hence, it is this data plus the 
official rayon-level returns for December 1995 that is the basis of this study. 
The data set for the June 1991 presidential elections is, with the exception of 1995, 
the most comprehensive one in our study. It consists of 2551 rayon-level observations, 
covers 87 of 89 regions, and accounts for 105. 7 million of the 107 million people who 
formed the eligible electorate. The two missing regions are the autonomous republics 
located on the far north of Russia. The data set includes voting totals for all of the 
six candidates as well as turnout rates, and the number of votes against all of the 
candidates and the number of invalid and unused ballots. Data for the April 1993 
referendum take the form of 2125 observations covering 68 of 89 regions and about 
91.1 million eligible voters (about 90 percent of the total). This data set includes 
vote counts for all but one oblast but none of the republics. The December 1993 
election is the most difficult to document, since the Central Election Commission to 
this day refuses to publish official rayon-level returns. Inexplicably, the bottom line, 
as asserted by the Commission's chair, is that such data does not exist. Our data 
set here, then, comes from a variety of different sources and includes 1298 rayon-
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level observations for voting on the constitution and 1167 rayon-level observations 
for voting on party-lists. The constitutional data set covers 41 regions and about 
52.9 million eligible voters, whereas the party-list data set includes 36 regions and 
about 48.2 million eligible voters. Most of the missing regions are the autonomous 
republics, the southern oblasts and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Despite 
these gaps, this data set appears to be fairly representative of the country as a whole 
- the share of votes given to the constitution and to the several major parties does not 
differ from the officially reported national average by more than two percent. Finally, 
the December 1995 election returns have been published by the Central Election 
Commission, and include all rayons and regions. 2 
Turning now to our method of analysis, suppose by way of example that two par-
ties, A and B, compete against each other in two consecutive elections, e = 1 and 2. 
Let the percentage of the eligible electorate voting for the two parties in each election 
be denoted by x: and x~, and let x~ denote the share of the electorate that failed to 
vote. Suppose now that party A lost votes, that B gained votes, and that the number 
of nonvoters decreased so that B's gain actually exceeds A's loss. Since there are only 
two parties, it is not too difficult to interpret these numbers, but even still such aggre-
gate numbers allow for an infinity of possibilities when it comes to describing the flows 
of voters and nonvoters. For example, B's increase might have come directly from A's 
voters in the previous election, as well as from the ranks of nonvoters; alternatively, 
B's new support might have come exclusively from old nonvoters, with a larger share 
of A's lost vote going into the ranks of nonvoters. Although both possibilities yield 
the same outcome, they present different interpretations of the outcome. If, in the 
first instance, the espoused ideologies of A and B differ radically, we would infer a 
somewhat unstable electorate in which voters switch from one extreme to the other, 
whereas in the second case we see fewer voters jumping across the ideological spec-
trum and more of them, when switching loyalties, first becoming indifferent between 
the parties. 
To see, then, how we might disentangle these possibilities using aggregate data, let 
us focus first on A's supporters in the second election and, to render the parameters we 
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must estimate identifiable, let us assume that any increased turnout comes exclusively 
from the ranks of previous nonvoters. What we want to learn, now, is the percentage 
of voters who supported A in both elections, the percentage if any who voted for party 
B in the first election but switched to A in the second, and, assuming that turnout 
increased from one election to the next, the percentage who abstained from voting in 
the first election but voted for A in the second. Formally, then, we are interested in 
estimating the coefficients a1, a~, and a~ of the following equation: 
Notice that this expression subtracts the share of the electorate that abstains in both 
elections. Since our example assumes that turnout increased, and since to render our 
model identifiable we must assume that anyone who voted in the first election voted 
as well in the second, we treat new voters as a separate party - as a part of the 
electorate that 'voted' not to vote in the first election. 
Unfortunately, no econometric method guarantees unbiased estimates of the vari-
ables in this model (King 1996). The primary difficulty is aggregation error, which 
arises whenever people in one observation act differently than people in some other. 
Nevertheless, we can estimate the elasticities of the coefficients if we accept the same 
assumptions that are implicit in any attempt, journalistic or otherwise, to infer sub-
stantive meaning from aggregate election returns. Specifically, we must assume that 
the value of coefficients do not vary across observations (or equivalently, across any 
subset of observations) and that our independent variables do not correlate signifi-
cantly. 
Now notice that since 
xf +xf +x~ = 100, 
or, equivalently, since 
x~ =.100 - xf- xf, 
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we can rewrite that expression as 
Thus, the elasticities of xf, xf, and x~, respectively, are a1 + K, a~+ K, and K. 3 
Suppose now that we have estimates of our coefficients and we ask: what inferences 
can we make about individual decisions. Naturally, if the model's assumptions are 
not satisfied - if aggregation error biases or otherwise renders our estimates mean-
ingless - the answer is 'nothing'. But notice that there are several checks on the 
consistency of those estimates. First, the estimated coefficients should not sum to 
a number significantly different from 1.0, since presumably supporters of A, B, and 
nonvoters exhaust the potential electorate (excluding 'hard core' nonvoters). Second, 
no individual coefficient should be significantly less than zero or greater than 1. Fi-
nally, we need to check the assumption that coefficients do not vary from one region 
to another. The particular danger here is aggregation error - estimates, for instance, 
that are, say, significant within various subpopulations but insignificant when the en-
tire data set is considered. The usual method here is to divide our sample into various 
subpopulations - subpopulations that are most likely to occasion different values for 
the coefficients. In the case of Russia, the most likely candidate is the divide between 
urban and rural populations, since there is considerable evidence that urban voters, 
owing to differences in information, education, and economic opportunities, respond 
differently to the parties than do rural voters (see Hough et al. 1996, Clem and 
Craumer 1993, 1995, and Slider et al. 1994).4 Hence, in the last section of this essay, 
we divide our data into 'urban' and 'non-urban' subpopulations and rerun several of 
our regressions to see if at least our qualitative conclusions are affected. 
To see now how we can interpret our estimates, suppose for purpose of an example 
that we estimate a1+Kat0.7. In this case we would infer that if party A's support 
increases in the first election by one percent, then A's support in the second election 
should increase by . 7 percent. An equivalent interpretation is that 70 percent of those 
who voted for A in the first election voted for A in the second. The caution that needs 
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to be applied here about either interpretation, though, is that if A's vote in the first 
election averaged, say, 40 percent, it is not necessarily the case that supporters in a 
district that gave him a mere 10 percent acted the same as supporters in one that 
gave him precisely 40 percent or the same as voters in a district that gave him 90 
percent. Our model is linear and, especially when treating variables constrained to 
values between 0 and 100 percent, it may not be true that extreme cases are like 
average ones. 
Notice now that our regressions delete one party, candidate, or referendum re-
sponse and allow its coefficient to be estimated by the constant term. We do this 
since, if all possible choices (including not voting and casting an invalid ballot) are 
included, our variables sum to 100 percent and our independent variables are linearly 
dependent. But in deleting a variable, we must delete a 'significant' one whose sup-
port does in fact vary across observations, since otherwise, our remaining variables 
will be approximately linearly dependent, and our estimates correspondingly unreli-
able. Some care, though, must be taken when choosing which variable to delete. If we 
delete one that bears a strong negative correlation to one that remains in the sample, 
then the mathematics of regression analysis tell us that some of our estimates will be 
strongly biased downwards. We should note here, however, that these problems do 
not generally arise here unless there are a 'great many' independent variables, which 
is to say that they tend to arise only when we examine the relationship between party 
list voting in the December 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections. 
Results 
Since we want to learn how voters who supported, say, reform, act subsequently, our 
dependent variables pertains to choices made in the second (most recent) election 
in the pair, and independent variables concern choices made in the first election. 
However, since the methodology is limited by the level of aggregation of our data and 
allows only estimates of the fl.ow of votes, we must focus on the "major" issues, such 
as support and opposition to reform, and primary candidates or parties. Thus, we do 
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not attempt to estimate the sources of support of a party that gathers a mere one or 
two percent of the vote; in these instances we group minor parties together according 
to a priori judgments about their ideological persuasions. 
Turning first to the analysis of the fl.ow of votes between June 1991 and April 
1993, we first divide the set of 1991 presidential candidates into four groups: Yeltsin, 
Ryzhkov, Zhirinovsky, and 'others'. The first thing we want to measure is the extent 
to which Yeltsin's supporters in 1991 supported him in April 1993 by answering Yes 
to the referendum's first question. In addition, we also want to see who was hurt most 
be the decline in turnout between these two elections. Thus, an additional dependent 
variable is the percentage of the electorate choosing not to vote in each rayon in April 
1993 minus the percentage who did not vote in 1991. 
The data in Table 2 show the results of our regressions, and presents our results in 
two forms. 5 Looking first at the column under 'Yeltsin', the first number tells us that 
of those who voted for Yeltsin in 1991, 73 percent voted Yes on the first referendum 
question, 8 percent voted No, and 18 percent failed to vote. The second number in 
parentheses tells us that of those who voted Yes in our data, 42.29 percent - or fully 
four-fifths came from people who voted for Yeltsin in 1991. In contrast, 87· percent 
of Ryzhkov's supporters in 1991 voted No and accounted for nearly one half the No 
vote in April. Zhirinovsky's voters and those who voted for other candidates, on the 
other hand, tended to split nearly evenly between v9ting Yes and No, with an edge 
given to an anti-Yeltsin vote of No. This is our first indication (but not our last) that 
we cannot easily characterize Zhirinovsky's base of Sl].pport vis-a-vis their attitudes 
toward reform. 6 
Of the things Table 2 reveals, two warrant emphasis. First, note the stability 
of that part of the electorate polarized between pro and anti-Yeltsin positions. Our 
estimates suggest that few members of the electorate - less than six percent of those 
who voted in 1991 - switched from a pro-Yeltsin vote in 1991 to a No vote in 1993 or 
from a pro-regime (Ryzhkov) vote in 1991 to a Yes .. vote in 1993. In this respect at 
least, the bipolarity McFaul infers with respect to t~e electorate between December 
1993 and 1995 (see hypothesis Hl) is not peculiar to those parliamentary contests; 
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a core of polarized voters appear to exist as early as 1991. If any fundamental shift 
occurred, it occurred within the pro-Yeltsin camp as nearly one-sixth of Yeltsin's 
earlier support disappeared into the ranks of nonvoters. If people were less enthu-
siastic about reform in April 1993, their moderated enthusiasm did not lead them 
to switch sides but led instead to growing indifference between both polar positions. 
Conversely, few of Ryzhkov or Zhirinovsky's voters in 1991 stayed home in April 1993. 
As a consequence, Yeltsin's support in 1991 of nearly 58 percent fades in April 1993 
to a bare majority. 
Turning next to the Russian electorate between April and December 1993 - to the 
elections that bracket Yeltsin's coup against the old Congress - we now let responses 
to the April referendum's first question correspond to our independent variables, and 
for dependent variables we consider both the constitutional referendum and voting on 
the party list elections to the State Duma. 7 Because turnout continued its decline we 
identify "nonvoters in December who voted in April" as a separate dependent variable, 
and since December also witnessed a sharp increase in the numbers of invalid ballots, 
we also create the category "voters who cast valid ballots in April but invalid ones in 
December" as an additional dependent variable to be explored. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of our regressions and reveals several patterns that 
correspond to what we already know about the December election. Perhaps most 
importantly, though, although few (four percent) of Yeltsin's April supporters appear 
to have opposed his constitution, the share of those who voted in April and supporting 
reform in December by voting for the constitution or for parties we might reasonably 
classify as reformist or centrist continues to decline as additional Yes voters from April 
enter the ranks of nonvoters. By our estimate, fully one quarter of those who voted 
Yes in April failed to appear at the polls in December. In contrast, although nearly 
one-fifth of those voting No in April voted for the constitution, little (two percent) 
of that opposition to Yeltsin's chose not to vote in December. Thus, the progressive 
'bleeding' of reformers into the ranks of abstainers, which began in April, continues 
and perhaps even accelerates in December. Aside from this erosion and despite the 
events of September and October, the bipolar stability that we observe in Table 3 
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and that corresponds to McFaul's first hypothesis is maintained: Of those supporting 
the constitution, 85 percent supported Yeltsin in April whereas among those voting 
against the constitution, fully 92 percent opposed Yeltsin in April. Overall, then, 
although it appears that few voters crossed over in their preferences, Yeltsin's support 
declines from a bare majority in April to something just above 41 percent in December. 
Looking now at voting for the party lists, the division of April Yes and No voters 
offers few surprises: votes for Russia's Choice and Yabloko come exclusively from 
those who voted Yes in April whereas votes for Communist and Agrarian parties 
come exclusively from those who voted No. Women of Russia and Travkin's DPR, 
true perhaps to the 'centrist' label often given them, derive their support from both 
Yes and No voters, although since there are more Yes than No voters, their support 
comes predominantly from Yes voters. Shakrai's list and those of the parties that 
failed to surpass the five percent threshold secure votes primarily from Yes voters. 
Finally, just as Zhirinovsky's 1991 voters divided approximately 1:2 against Yeltsin 
in April, support for the LDPR in December comes from both pro and anti-Yeltsin 
camps in approximately the same ratio. Once again, then, we cannot put the LDPR 
into the same opposition and anti-reform category as we might place Communists 
and Agrarians. 
Perhaps the most interesting question about December concerns Zhirinovsky's 
vote. The numbers in Table 3 suggest the following: if we assume that Zhirinovsky 
succeeded in keeping his 1991 voters, then approximately one quarter (3.12 percent of 
those who voted in April) of that additional support came from people who supported 
Yeltsin in April and three quarters (8.98 percent) came from No voters. This estimate, 
though, leaves unanswered the subsidiary question as to why Yes voters who defected 
from Yeltsin defected only to Zhirinovsky (as opposed to Communists or Agrarians). 
Myagkov and Sobyanin's (1995) answer is that this apparent defection (as well as 
an equal number from the No category) represents election fraud - ballots added 
to the total in order to increase turnout and render the constitutional referendum 
legitimate. Indeed, if we assume that 3.12 percent of those who voted Yes in April 
but for Zhirinovsky in December as well as 3.12 percent who voted No in April 
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but for Zhirinovsky as well are falsified ballots, we come to an estimate of fraud's 
magnitude (6.24 percent times an April turnout of 64.2 million = 4 million ballots 
falsified for Zhirinovsky) that is in the ball park of Sobyanin's (1995) initial estimate 
of 6.3 million. Admittedly, however, such speculations take us beyond the confines 
of our analysis, and the overall picture painted by Table 3 is of an electorate that 
continues to melt away from pro-reform positions into the ranks of nonvoters and the 
absence of crossovers between reform and anti-reform (communist) camps. Although 
McFaul formulates his seventh hypothesis about the impact of party proliferation for 
the December 1995 election, it applies here as well if we classify the five small parties 
that failed to qualify for seats as pro-reform, since they secured virtually all of their 
votes from those who voted Yes in April. Moreover, although Travkin's DPR and 
Women of Russia won votes from both Yes and No April voters, the plurality of Yes 
over No means that both parties secured a majority of their vote from Yes voters. The 
implication, then, is that if their Yes voters are like the rest, the presence of Women of 
Russia and DPR on the ballot also reduced the relative support recorded by Russia's 
Choice and Yabloko. On the other hand, had Zhirinovsky not been in the race, and 
if his Yes and No voters were polarized between pro and anti-reform positions like all 
the rest, elimination of the LDPR from the contest would have contributed more to 
Communist and Agrarian party totals than to any other. 
When we turn to the December 1995 parliamentary election we confront some new 
methodological problems that derive not only from the great number of parties that 
competed then (43), but also from the large number (13) that competed in December 
1993. The specific problem is that our estimates become increasing unreliable to the 
extent that our independent variables (the support given to each party) are linearly 
dependent. In our case the set of all such variables, taken together, are dependent 
in that they must sum to 100 percent. However, recall that we delete one variable 
from each regression and allow its coefficient to be determined by the constant term. 
If this variable accounts for a 'significant' part of the eligible electorate and if it 
varies 'sufficiently' in the data, then multicolinearity is manageable. But if there 
are a many independent variables and if no one of them accounts for a significant 
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share of the vote or has support that fails to vary significantly across observations, 
multicolinearity re-emerges. Our approach here, then, is to first group the parties 
that competed in 1993 into four categories: the Communist Party plus Agrarians, 
Zhirinovsky's LDPR, centrist and reform (Travkin's DPR, Women of Russia, Russia's 
Choice, Yabloko, Shakrai's Unity and Accord, etc.), invalid ballots, and new voters. 
After ascertaining which groups contributed support to each significant party in 1995, 
we subdivide those groups and estimate each party's contribution within the group, 
but only after we re-cluster the groups that are not indicated as providing significant 
support by the first regression. 
Table 4, then, gives the results of our first pass at the data (since these estimates 
are preliminary, we do not offer any estimate in parentheses of the division of the 
full electorate across party lists). Notice the considerable increase in the number of 
coefficients estimated to be negative and significant - a sure sign that our positive 
estimates are biased upwards. Nevertheless, we do see in this table approximately 
the same pattern we saw earlier with respect to the bipolarity of the electorate. 
For example, of those that voted for 'Democrats, center parties, and against all' in 
1993, none are indicated as voting for the LDPR, Communist or Agrarian parties, 
Anpilov or Rutskoi. Instead, their votes are spread out nearly uniformly across the 
remaining parties, including various clusters of parties that individually received only 
a small fraction of the vote. Conversely, those who voted for the Communist or 
Agrarian parties in 1993 voted much the same way in 1995. But notice here that this 
communist vote, although dissipated somewhat across five parties, concentrates itself 
in the Communist Party. Thus, although the communist vote is dissipated somewhat 
by the presence of Anpilov and Rutskoi on the ballot, it is far less uniform than 
the 'democratic and centrist' vote. McFaul's seventh hypothesis about the damage 
done to democrats by the proliferation of parties, then, is largely borne out by this 
preliminary analysis. Insofar as Zhirinovsky's lost support is concerned, Table 4 
suggests that much of this support went to the Communist Party, with smaller shares 
going to Rutskoi, Anpilov, Lebed and Govorukin. The primary beneficiaries of the 
increased turnout are Yabloko, Derzhava, and the Communists. Thus, Table 4 at 
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least, fails to support for McFaul's fifth hypothesis about the basis of support for 
Anpilov's Working Russia. 
Finally, consider the column 'invalid ballots', which attempts to estimate the 
beneficiaries of the relative decline in the number of invalid ballots. Owing to the 
considerable number of statistically significant negative estimates, our positive esti-
mates cannot be regarded as reliable; nevertheless, the suggestion here is that the 
primary beneficiaries of this decline were 'other democrats', Women of Russia, the 
LDPR, the Communist Party, Agrarians, and Anpilov. This is indeed a curious mix, 
but before we attempt any interpretation of things, let us turn to the refinement of 
our analysis in which we try to dissect further the basis of each party's support. Table 
5 presents our results, except that here, rather than present a multitude of columns 
with statistically insignificant estimates, the last column reports only those estimates 
that are statistically significant for the parties we label 'Democrats and center' in 
Table 4 (as before, the numbers in parentheses denote the overall percentage of the 
vote given to parties from the 1993 electorate). 
Looking first at the first nine rows of this table, notice that Russia's Choice re-
ceives only about one quarter of its 1993 vote; in conformity with McFaul's sixth and 
seventh hypotheses, the remainder is spread across a broad mix of parties, including 
not only Our Home Is Russia, but also the party lists of S. Federov, Popov, Lebed, 
and Govorukin, and our aggregation of 15 insignificant parties (row 9). Yavlinski's 
support, in contrast, is remarkably stable: Yabloko retains all of its 1993 vote and 
picks up additional small shares from Gaidar (.72 percent), Shakrai's Unity and Ac-
cord (.86 percent), and from new voters (1.68 percent). The 15 small parties in 
row 9 get only .56 of the vote from Yabloko, whereas the party lists associated with 
Lebed, Govorukin, S. Federov, and Popov get none. The picture here, then, is of one 
party, Russia's Choice, that hemorrhaged in nearly every direction, and of another, 
Yabloko, that maintained its base of support but failed to attract significant votes 
from anywhere else. 
Turning now to the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, to rows 10 through 
14 of Table 5, notice first that no coefficient in the last column under 'democratic + 
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centrist' is significant or positive; the bipolarity of the electorate is sustained. But if 
there is a parallel to Russia's Choice in the 'opposition' camp, it is the LDPR, whose 
1993 vote dissipates across the LDPR, Rutskoi and company, the Communist Party, 
and Anpilov. Indeed, contrary to hypotheses H3 and H5, nearly half of Anpilov's 
vote comes from the LDPR, as well as nearly half of Rutskoi's and the Communist 
Party's. In contrast, the only significant loss experienced by the Communist Party is 
to Rutskoi's list. 
Now consider the columns denoted 'invalid ballots' and 'new voters'. The primary 
beneficiary of increased turnout is the Communist Party, which secures nearly one-
third of all new voters, and overall, opposition parties secure nearly 60 percent of 
all such votes. However, although 12 percent of this increase is 'wasted' on Anpilov 
and Rutskoi et al. 's lists owing to their failure to qualify for seats in the Duma, 
democratic and centrist parties waste even more - all but the 12 percent of increased 
turnout that goes to Yabloko and the 5 percent that goes to Our Home Is Russia. 
Thus, the combination of fractionalization among democrats and the general edge 
given to opposition parties among new voters gives the Communists a 2-to-1 edge 
over democrats among new voters whose votes counted. Perhaps more importantly, 
though, recall that as turnout declined between 1991 and December 1993, the lost 
votes came almost exclusively from the reformist camp - from voters who voted for 
Yeltsin in 1991 and who voted Yes on the April referendum's first question. But 
those voters who 'reappear' in 1995 do not return by voting for reform; instead, a 
clear majority vote for opposition parties. The evide~ce, then, is consistent with the 
hypothesis that a significant part of the electorate - over eight percent of those voting 
in 1995 - moved from supporting reform in 1991 to oppose it in 1995, but only after 
they passed through a period of indifference to all parties and positions. 
The analysis of invalid ballots, the third column in Table 5, is interesting in and 
of itself. The difficulty here is that we are dealing with a relatively small fraction of 
the electorate, less than 5 percent, which helps to .. make our estimates less reliable 
than usual. This fact is borne out by the prolifera~ion of negative estimates in the 
corresponding column of Table 5. Nevertheless, acc~·pting that our positive estimates 
'i 
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are in all likelihood biased upwards, Notice that the primary beneficiary of the decline 
in invalid ballots is the communist party, with the LDPR and Our Home Is Russia 
a close second and third, respectively. This is indeed curious, since normally we 
would expect invalid ballots to be spread uniformly across the parties. It is as if 
only the 'party of power' and the primary opposition parties can attract previously 
'stupid' voters. We might, of course, attempt to fashion a variety of stories to explain 
these estimates, but here we note simply that if the sharp rise in invalid ballots in 
1993 is somehow a byproduct of election fraud (Sobyanin 1995), our estimates here 
suggest that that fraud was not a uniform phenomena but concentrated somehow in 
rayons that gave the LDPR, the Communist Party, and any party associated with 
the Kremlin special support. 
Finally, Table 5 allows us to reconsider McFaul's fourth hypothesis about the 
vanishing center in Russian politics. If we take the center in 1993 to be Shakrai's 
Unity and Accord, Travkin's DPR, Women of Russia, and those parties that failed 
to qualify for seats, we cannot confirm H4. Our estimates at least suggest that the 
DPR's vote, for instance, dissipates across Our Home Is Russia, the lists offered by S. 
Federov, Popov, Lebed and Govorukin, plus other democratic parties such as those 
headed by Pamfivoliva and Boris Federov. Women of Russia appear to have given 
their lost votes primarily to Pamfivoliva, B. Federov and our collection of 15 small 
parties, whereas Shakrai lost votes primarily to Rybkin, with smaller shares given to 
Our Home Is Russia, Yabloko, and a variety of insignificant parties. Indeed, regardless 
of how we re-constitute our categories of parties, we find no evidence that the votes 
lost by any of these parties went to any opposition party. 
In summary, then, of the seven hypotheses that summarize McFaul's analysis, 
four are confirmed here but three are not. Hypotheses Hl: "Russian politics are 
bipolar," H2: "no change in the balance of support between the two camps," H6: 
"Chernomirdin got votes mostly from Gaidar's supporters," and H7: "party prolifer-
ation within the reformist camp weakened the representation of reformists within the 
Duma are strongly supported"; on the other hand we find little evidence consistent 
with H3: "shift from nationalism toward communism", H4: "centrist voters voted for 
69 
the opposition," and H5: "the opposition benefited from the high turnout in 1995." It 
is not so much that we see a migration of centrist voters into the opposition camp or 
a bevy of new voters supporting extremist lists such as Anpilov's. Instead, if we see 
change it is primarily in the form of a segment of the electorate - perhaps as much as 
ten percent - making the transition from supporting reform to indifference to voting 
with the opposition. 
Long-term Trends and Conclusions 
Thus far, we have examined pairs of adjacent elections, but, as a check on our con-
clusions, two other comparisons should be considered - comparisons that allow us to 
trace the fl.ow of votes directly from the 'heyday' of reform, 1991, to December 1993 
and 1995. Looking first, then, at the comparison of 1991 to 1995, Table 6 gives our 
results in the same form as before. 8 Three things in particular are apparent from this 
table: 
First, those who voted in 1991 for the communist candidate Ryzhkov continue to 
vote against reform by supporting opposition parties in 1995. Indeed, those who voted 
for any candidate other than Yeltsin in 1991 vote, with but some small exceptions, 
for opposition lists in 1995. 
Second, Yeltsin's original support in 1991, although continuing to favor parties 
that are not explicitly opposed to reform (the parties corresponding to rows 1 through 
9 in Table 6) 2 to 1 over parties opposed to reform, is nearly uniformly spread across 
party lists. Moreover, although Zhirinovsky's LDPR gains seven percent of this vote, 
the Communist Party gains even more, ten percent. In a word, Yeltsin's original 
support has dissipated to nearly all points. 
Finally, notice that although some of Ryzhkov's voters (approximately 15 percent 
of his original vote) have entered the ranks of nonvoters, some 20 percent of Yeltsin's 
far larger share are nonvoters in 1995. Hence, even though turnout increased in 1995 
over the levels it achieved in 1993, a significant part of the electorate that favored 
Yeltsin in 1991 continued to stay away from the polls four years later. 
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Turning now to Table 7, which compares 1991 with December 1993, we see a some-
what clearer picture of the fl.ow of Yeltsin's original support. In particular, notice that 
although the LDPR gets ten percent of Yeltsin's original vote, the Communist and 
Agrarian parties, in contrast to 1995, together get none of it! Moreover, fully 37 
percent of Yeltsin's vote enters the nonvoting ranks whereas only 30 percent vote for 
Russia's Choice, Yabloko, Future of Russia or RDDR and another 16 percent vote for 
the remaining (centrist?) parties on the ballot. Insofar as the constitutional referen-
dum is concerned, 47 percent of Yeltsin's original supporters vote for his constitution 
- presumably those who voted for reform and centrist parties - whereas 77 percent 
of those supporting Ryzhkov voted against the constitution. Interestingly, notice 
that, in keeping with his campaign advice, Zhirinovsky's supports also give majority 
approval to the constitution. 
Tables 6 and 7 together, then, are consistent with the view offered earlier of a 
'reform' electorate that erodes into ranks of nonvoters, and reappears in 1995 as part 
of the support garnered by the opposition to Yeltsin's policies and reform. This 
finding about the ebb and fl.ow of nonvoters, along with the finding that the original 
support received by Communist and opposition candidates has largely held firm, is 
perhaps this essay's core conclusion. However, before we can give full confidence to 
such conclusions, we must check the potential for aggregation error - the possibility 
that, contrary to our assumption that the same parameters characterize all rayons, 
different subpopulations act differently. 
As a partial check against such error, the data at our disposal allows us to check 
for the possibility that urban and rural voters act differently. We know, of course, that 
such voters not only confront different economic and social circumstances and that 
they are impacted by Yeltsin's policies differently, but that they also vote differently, 
with urban voters being much more supportive of Yeltsin and reformist parties than 
rural voters (see, for example, Hough et al. 1996, Clem and Craumer 1993, 1995, 
and Slider et al. 1994) and with rural rayons reporting much higher rates of turnout 
than urban ones. The question, however, is whether, for instance, rural voters who 
supported Yeltsin in 1991 defected in different ways subsequently than did voters who 
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came from cities. 
Table 8, then, reproduces the coefficients reported in Table 6 except that each cell 
reports two coefficients - the first for rayons with 70 percent or more urban residents 
and the second for their 'non-urban' counterparts. Perhaps the two most important 
things revealed by this table, at least from the perspective of the conclusions we offer 
earlier, is, first, that regardless of whether we look at urban or non-urban subpop-
ulations, Yeltsin's 1991 vote disperses itself across the ideological spectrum whereas 
Ryzhkov's vote holds firm against reform in 1995. Second, 20 percent or more of 
Yeltsin's original vote, both urban and rural, became nonvoters in 1995 whereas none 
of Ryzhkov's urban support and only 13 percent of his rural support failed to vote in 
Russia's second parliamentary election. 
This is not to say that there are no differences between urban and rural vot-
ers. Notice, for example, that if we look down Yeltsin's column, the first coefficient 
is greater than the second in the first nine rows, but thereafter (excepting the last 
row, which corresponds to the difference in turnout) the second number is greater. 
The implication, then, is that in urban constituencies, the majority (but not all) of 
Yeltsin's vote moved to reformist or centrist parties, whereas in rural rayons that 
vote moved predominantly to anti-reform parties. Here, however, we can only infer 
general tendencies since more often than not the coefficient for urban and nonur-
ban subpopulations are not statistically significantly different - a fact that gives us 
some confidence in believing that aggregation error does not significantly impair our 
previous conclusions. We should, though, offer one note of caution with respect to 
Zhirinovsky's 1991 supporters. Although we are concerned here with less than eight 
percent of the electorate, the coefficients for those voters seem especially unstable, 
with significant negative values appearing in three of our regressions (the regressions 
corresponding to Russia's Choice, the Communists, and nonvoters). A coefficient of 
60 for urban rayons and -20 for rural ones with respect to nonvoters suggests the 
possibility of significant aggregation error in our overall estimate of the coefficient for 
Zhirinovsky with respect to this regression in Table 6. Notice that a similar problem 
exists with respect to Ryzhkov's supporters. Although the difference there, 0 versus 
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13, is less pronounced than for Zhirinovsky, neither of these numbers is as great as 
the estimate Table 6 reports for the share of Ryzhkov voters who became nonvoters 
in 1995. This disparity suggests that the percentage given in Table 6, 15 percent, 
overestimates the share of the communist vote that failed to appear at the polls. Of 
course, this possibility merely strengthens our conclusion that new nonvoters in 1993 
and 1995 came predominantly from Yeltsin's original base of support. 
Overall, then, the analysis offered here paints a remarkably consistent picture of 
hard-and-fast opposition, a part of the electorate that moves from supporting reform 
to opposing it after first becoming indifferent to all candidates, and a reform core that 
succeeded in both parliamentary elections in dividing itself up among a plethora of 
candidates and parties. It remains to be seen, of course, whether reform candidates in 
the future can recapture some of their lost support or whether the erosion witnessed 
over the last four years will continue. 
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Table 1: Summary of Election Outcomes 





Against All 1.9 
Turnout 74.7 
Confidence to Yeltsin 1 58.7% 
No Confidence to Yeltsin 38.5 
Turnout 64.2 
Russia's Choice 14.3 3.9 
Our Home is Russia - 10.3 
Other Democrats - 4.8 
Rybkin, Shakrai 6.2 1.49 
RDDR 3.8 -
DPR 5.1 -
Yabloko 7.3 7.0 
Others 4.3 -
S. Federov, G. Popov - 4.1 
Lebed, Govorukin - 5.41 
·::~ 
Women of Russia 
~ 7.5 4.7 
LDPR 21.1 11.4 
Derzhava - 4.9 
Communist 11.5 22.7 
Working Russia - 4.6 
Agrarians 7.4 3.8 
Against All 3.9 2.83 
Invalid 7.6 1.23 








Table 2: Vote Changes 
Between 1991 and April 1993 
Yeltsin Ryzhkov Zhirinovsky Others 
73 7 36 30 
( 42.29) (1.15) (2.86) (5.27) 
8 87 55 52 
(4.64) (14.4) (4.37) (9.13) 
18 4 5 14 
(10.4) (.07) (.04) (2.33) 
1 2 2 3 
(.058) (0.32) (.15) (.48) 
100 100 98 99 






Numbers in parentheses are percentages of those who voted. 
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Table 3: Vote Changes 
Between April and December 1993 
Yes No Totals 
For Constitution 69% 19% 
( 41.2) (7.24) (48.66) 
Against Constitution 4 78 
(2.39) (29.7) (33.53) 
Nonvoters 25 2 
(14.95) (.76) . (15.71) 
Invalid ballots 6 6 
(3.58) (2.28) (6.21) 
Russia's Choice 23 -4 
(13.7) (-1.52) (12.10) 
Yabloko 10 0 
(5.92) (0) (6.1) 
DPR 4 4 
(2.32) (1.52) (4.2) 
Unity and Accord 6 2 
(3.58) (.76) (5.22) 
Women of Russia 6 6 
(3.58) (2.28) (6.3) 
LDPR 10 35 
(5.98) (13.35) (20.08) 
Communists 0 22 
(0) (8.38) (8.91) 
Agrarians -6.0 25 
(-3.58) (9.52) (6.20) 
Others 14 2 
(8.37) (.76) (9.13) 
Totals 98/104 99/104 
(59.8) (38.1) 
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Table 4: Vote Changes From 1991 to 1995 
ota s 
01ce 
(2.55) (0) (-.62) (0) (1.93) 
Our Home is Russia 11 -1 0 
(6.16) (.62) (0) (7.87) 
Other Democrats 5.9 0 0 1.9 
(3.28) (0) (0) (.27) (3.55) 
Rybkin, Shakrai & Others 3.6 0 7 -2.7 
(2.0) (0) (.58) (-48) (2.1) 
Yabloko 10 -3 0 
(5.56) (-.78) (0) (5.08) 
S. Federov, G. Popov 5 0 0 5 
(2.75) (0) (0) (0.7) (3.45) 
Lebed, Govorukin 7 2 0 
(3.89) (0.58) (0) (4.47) 
Women of Russia 3.4 0 6.1 4.3 
(1.89) (0) (.50) (.60) (2.99) 
15 Small Parties 6 0 0 2 
(3.36) (0) (0) (.28) (3.64) 
LDPR 7 6 46 10 
(3.89) (1.07) (3.82) (1.40) (10.18) 
Derzhava 3.7 7.4 14 -2 
(2.0) (1.32) (1.16) (-.28) (4.2) 
Communist 10 42 5 62 
(5.56) (7.58) (.4) (8.78) (22.32) 
Working Russia 2 5.4 20 2 
(1.1) (.96) (1.7) (.3) (4.06) 
Agrarians -2 18 8 4 
(-1.1) (3.22) (.66) (.56) (3.34) 




(53.45) (17.25) (9.03) (13.21) 
77
Table 5: Vote Changes From December 1993 to 1995
RC Yabl Others Zir Com Inv NV
Russia's Choice 25 0 0 0 -2 0 6
(3.15) (0) (0) (0) (-.3) (0) (-8)
Our Home is Russia 26 0 Travkin 17 (.7) 0 0 36 5
(4.5) (0) Shakrai 25 (1.15) (0) (0) (2.19) (-7)
Yabloko 6 100 Travkin 18 (.86) -2 -2 -19 12
(-72) (6.24) (-.4) (-.3) (-1.15) (1.68)
Other Democrats 28 4 Travkrn 18 (.80) 0 0 -10 3
(3.3) (.24) WOR 19 (1.21) (0) (0) (-.6) (.42)
Rybkin. Shakrai 0 0 Shakrai 67 (3.20) 0 0 0 -10
(0) (0) Others 9 (.88) (0) (0) (0) (-1.4)
S. Federov, G. Popov 15 0 Travkin 18 (.8) 0 0 -11 5
(1-8) (0) Others 20 (1.9) (0) (0) (-.66) GO
Lebed, Govorukin 17 0 Travkrn 73 (3.25) 0 0 -16 10
(2.04) (0) (0) (0) (-.97) (1.4)
Women of Russia 0 0 WOR 56 (3.59) 0 0 0 7
(0) (0) Others 10 (.98) (0) (0) (0) (.98)
15 Small Parties 14 9 Shakrai 10 (.47) 0 0 0 9
(1.68) (.56) WOR 26 (1) 
Others 14 (1.3)
(0) (0) (0) (1.3)
LDPR -2 34 10 43 14
(-86) (6.8) (1.5) (2.6) (1.96)
Derzhava (-.3.6) 11 25.6 5 10
(-1.54) (2.2) (2.26) (.3) (1.6)
Communist -11 58 56 50 32
(-4.73) (11.6) (8.4) (3.0) (4.48)
Working Russia 0 7.3 14 24 2
(0) (1.46) (.86) (1.44) (.28)
Agrarians 0 0 59 0 0
(0) (0) (5.39) (0) (0)
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Table 6: Vote Changes From 1991 to 1995
Yeltsin Ryzhkov Zhirinovsky Others Totals
Russia's Choice 4.6 0 -7.5 0
(2.55) (0) (-.62) (0) (1.93)
Our Home is Russia 11 -1 - 0
(6.16) (.62) - (0) (7.87)
Other Democrats 5.9 0 0 1.9
(3.28) (0) (0) (.27) (3.55)
Rybkin, Shakrai ⅛ Others 3.6 0 7 -2.7
(2.0) (0) (.58) (-48) (2.1)
Yabloko 10 -3 0
(5.56) (-.78) - (0) (5.08)
S. Federov, G. Popov 5 0 0 5
(2.75) (0) (0) (0.7) (3.45)
Lebed, Govorukin 7 2 0
(3.89) (0.58) - (0) (4.47)
Women of Russia 3.4 0 6.1 4.3
(1.89) (0) (.50) (.60) (2.99)
15 Small Parties 6 0 0 2
(3.36) (0) (0) (.28) (3.64)
LDPR 7 6 46 10
(3.89) (1.07) (3.82) (1.40) (10.18)
Derzhava 3.7 7.4 14 -2
(2.0) (1.32) (116) (-28) (4.2)
Communist 10 42 5 62
(5.56) (7.58) (-4) (8.78) (22.32)
Working Russia 2 5.4 20 2
(4.06)(1.1) (.96) (1.7) (.3)
Agrarians -2 18 8 4
(3.34)(-1.1) (3.22) (.66) (.56)
Nonvoters 19 15 10 6










Table 7: Vote Changes From 1991 to 1993 
Yeltsin Ryzhkov Zhirinovsky Others Totals 
Democrats 
Russia's Choice, Yabloko 30% 0 -21 11 
Future of Russia, RDDR (17.64) (0) (-1.5) (1.5) (17.64) 
LDPR 10 10 80 24 
(5.8) (1.6) (6.0) (3.26) (28.5) 
Communist & Agrarians 0 61 18 17 
(0) (9.78) (1.35) (2.31) (13.44) 
Others 16% 12 -6 22 
(9.4) (192) (-0.45) (2.99) (13.86) 
Invalid Ballots 6 9 -8 6 
(3.52) (l.44) (-0.60) (0.81) (5.17) 
Turnout Difference 37 2 22 17 
(21.75) (0.32) (1.65) (2.31) (26.08) 
~\. 
For Constitution 47% 15 50 45 
(27.6) (2.4) (3.75) (6.12) (39.87) 
Against Constitution 12 77 27 34 
(7.05) (12.35) (2.02) (4.62) (26.04) 
Totals 99/96 94/94 85/99 97/96 
(58.1/ (15.6/ 6.45/ (13.18/ 
56.4) 15.1) 7.42) 13.1) 
. I 
80 
Table 8: Vote Changes From 1991 to 1995; 
U rban/N on-Urban Rayons 
Yeltsin Ryzhkov Zhirinovsky Others 
Russia's Choice 3/1.8 0/0 -18/0 0/0 
Our Home is Russia 11/9.8 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Other Democrats 6/3 1/0 0/3 0/1.6 
Rybkin, Shakrai & Others 4.5/2.5 -6/2 21/0 -6/0 
Yabloko 13/4.8 0/0 0/0 0/1.8 
S. Federov, G. Popov 4.8/2 0/.4 0/.4 7/2.5 
Lebed, Govorukin 6.5/4.5 3/3 3/3 0/1 
Women of Russia 3.5/2.5 -2/0 17 /2.5 3/3.5 
15 Small Parties 6.1/5 2.8/0 2.8/0 7.8/0 
LDPR 6/8 6/7 40/48 13/8 
Derzhava 3.3/5 14/5 3/16 -1/0 
Communist 8/16 54/42 -47 /27 62/56 
Working Russia 2/3.6 3/5 20/9 1/3.5 
Agrarians 0/2.4 5/18 8/2 0/8 
Nonvoters 20/25 0/13 60/-20 -13/13 
81 
Chapter 4 Irregularities in the 
December 1993 Russian Election Returns 
Introduction 
The results of past elections in Russia have been a subject of considerable controversy. 
According to Alexander Sobyanin, for example, no fewer than 9 million ballots were 
falsified during the December 1993 elections. Moreover, the number of such accounts 
has been considerably growing during the past five years. Insofar as the specifics 
of the Russian case are concerned, the general acceptance of allegations of fraud is 
unsurprising. First and most suspiciously, official elections returns have never been 
published except at a very high level of aggregation - the region - that precludes re-
analysis. Second, neutral observers had virtually no opportunity to organize effective 
oversight. Third, given the stakes of the election - control of the national legislature 
(1993 and 1995) and adoption of a new federal constitution (1993) - even cautious 
observers would concede that fraud must have occurred at some level. 
What are the means of detecting and uncovering elections fraud? Obviously, one 
who in building a case to support such allegations in a court of law should primarily 
focus on voter registration rolls, actual ballots that had been cast, and accounts by 
witnesses and observers. Unfortunately such a way to approach this problem does not 
work in Russia because the Central Election Commission, which is supposed to collect 
such evidence and release it to the public, usually acts as if no laws are written to 
regulate its activities. For example, the Russian Parliament voted a number of times 
in 1994 and 1995 to compel the Commission to release the December 1993 election 
returns to the public. All such requests have been ignored. Moreover, in Russia it is 
incredibly difficult to arrange for observers to be present at any significant proportion 
of the over forty thousand voting stations. This happens primarily because of the 
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lack of transportation to and from rural areas. Thus, in the absence of observers and 
actual ballots, the only possibility that remains to make inferences about falsification 
of election results is to look at aggregated voting totals. The lower the level of 
aggregation, the more observations are available for the analysis, the fewer the number 
of logically admissible scenarios, and, as a result, the more reliable the analysis can 
be done. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a formal methodology of studying 
aggregated election returns which can be used to detect election fraud using the 
December 1993 parliamentary elections voting data as an example. Of course, it is 
impossible to prove or disprove the hypothesis of fraud simply on the basis of voting 
data. One might always argue that people just voted the way the data show, no 
matter how weird the voting patterns look. Therefore, the bottom line of the analysis 
presented here is not that election fraud was (or was not) one of the factors of the 
electoral process. Instead, the methodology presented here allows to detect "voting 
irregularities" that might raise suspicion of foul play. 
Elections in Russia: Before and After 1985 
Free popular elections were not of importance in Russia before 1985. The monopoly 
on power of the Communist Party (Article 6 of the USSR constitution) allowed no 
other party or organization to offer competing candidates. Nominations were made 
by party officials, and the general public had little opportunity to influence the pro-
cess. No more than one candidate was nominated for a seat, essentially no political 
campaigning was allowed, and no one could express views other than those officially 
sanctioned by officials. In this regime, elections were organized as a show of public 
support for the candidates of a "stable block of communists and non-party members." 
Responsibility for staging the show was in the hands of local party authorities, and 
official results always approximated 99.99 percentage approval for the candidates of 
the Communist Party and 99.99 percent turnout. All of the above suggests that the 
electoral process was far from what free and democratic elections are supposed to 
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be. Moreover, institutions filled by popular election (soviets) played no significant 
political or executive role. 
The adoption of a new electoral law in 1987 for the USSR opened a new page in the 
process of democratization. One-half of the members of the new Union Congress were 
elected in the first multi-candidate elections since 1917, and, although the Communist 
Party kept control of over 50 percent of the seats, ordinary voters had the opportunity 
to choose between different candidates and to participate in the nomination process. 
Some degree of free campaigning was also allowed. In the parliamentary elections 
in Russia in 1990 for the RCPD, no seats were allotted to the Communist Party or 
to other organizations. All candidates were selected through multi-candidate, single-
member district competition. The Presidential election in 1991, which produced six 
candidates, became the first in Russian history in which mass media were used as 
a campaigning tool. Finally, parliamentary elections in December 1993 brought a 
multi-party system into Russian political institutions. 
As election rules and laws became more democratic, as people secured the oppor-
tunity to exercise their right to vote, there remained one factor that had not been the 
subject of reform and which concerns this research. That factor is who has control of 
the actual conduct of elections. 
Who were the officials responsible for supervising elections and counting ballots? 
Local authorities, it turns out, were still in charge of the process, as they were 10, 20, 
or 30 years before. They have been "running" the regions for many years and control 
everything from regional policies and budgets to crop harvesting. The overwhelming 
power retained by local authorities with respect to the electoral process has been a 
cornerstone of elections in Russia for several decades. That power was robust against 
any political changes or reforms. Before 1991 regional authorities were officially called 
"secretaries of oblast party committees." After August of 1991 they became "Heads 
of Local Administration." Despite the fact that the Communist party was officially 
eliminated as a ruling power, virtually all local party bosses were reappointed by 
Yeltsin as heads of local administration. That meant not only the same style of 
ruling as before, but also the same personalities playing the game. Thus, even though 
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the election rules have become more democratic, their implementation has remained 
unchanged. On the other hand, some changes have had differential impact up on 
urban versus rural areas. Observers at polling places, media coverage of the pre-
election campaigns, as well as the relatively high degree of political activity of voters 
played an increasing role in many big cities. Those factors make it difficult for local 
authorities to entirely control elections. In contrast, most villages and small cities have 
not been touched by reforms, and, as many observers contend, it is those places that 
became a major source of voting irregularities during the December 1993 elections. 
The December 1993 Russian elections, which were held only two months after the 
dissolution of the Russian Congress of People Deputies, presented voters with four 
decisions: 
1. Election of an independent deputy to the State Duma (the lower chamber of the 
legislature). One half of the Duma was to be formed on the basis of 225 single 
member districts. 
2. A party list preferential vote. The other half of the Duma was to be elected in 
one national district through a party list, proportional representation system 
with a five percent cutoff level. 
3. Choice of two candidates to the newly created upper legislative chamber, the 
Federation Council. Candidates to the Federation Council were running in 89 
two-member districts, and each voter could (but did not have to) cast two 
votes. The 89 districts corresponded to the 89 subjects (regions) of the Russian 
Federation. 
4. Approval or disapproval of a draft of the new Russian constitution, backed by 
Yeltsin, which, if accepted, would provide the president with enormous power. 
The results of the election were very different from what had been expected. The 
major surprise was the distribution of votes across the party lists for election to the 
State Duma. All pre-election polls suggested that voters supported reforms and, 
therefore, that Russia's Choice would win a plurality, if not a majority, of seats. 
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Communists and agrarians did not appear to have significant support, and nation-
alists were below the five percent cutoff level (Shlapentokh 1995). Nevertheless, the 
final outcome gave a clear plurality to Zhirinovsky's nationalist Liberal Democrats. 
Democrats (Russia's Choice) and Communists ended up close to each other in second 
and third place respectively. 
A number of hypotheses have been offered to explain the outcome. Some authors 
have argued that polling techniques were poor, and that the results of public opin-
ion polls cannot be trusted to reflect voter preferences (Shlapentokh 1995). Others 
look to the effects of the electoral law, combined with the inability of democrats to 
form coalitions (Remington 1994). A third hypothesis is that massive election fraud 
exaggerated the difference between the outcome and pre-election polls. The basis 
for such claims is that election results have not been officially published, and voting 
data, unofficially acquired by representatives of the Russia's Choice, suggest various 
irregularities. 
A number of articles in Russian and foreign newspapers, motivated by "strange" 
election outcomes, argue that an official investigation should be launched to assess 
these allegations of fraud (Sobyanin 1994a, Sobyanin 1994b; Sobyanin and Sukhovol-
skii 1994; Salie 1994; Vizitovich 1994; Piatkovskii 1994). The influential newspaper 
"MK" (Moskovskii Komsomolets) called the elections "a brick fallen on the head of 
Russian democracy" (Sorokina 1994). Others argue that no fraud occurred since the 
Central Election Commission approved the results of the elections, and that the issue 
of fraud is a legal question and that "no mathematidaj speculations may imply such 
suspicion" (Vedeneev and Lysenko 1994). The only official response to allegations 
of fraud from the office of presidential administration took the same line: " .. . those 
people [Sobyanin and his group] used to analyze election results, then they started to 
implement some scientific methods. I doubt that their methods are correct" (Filatov 
1994). 
This chapter investigates whether or not the hypothesis of significant election 
fraud can be rejected on the basis of available data. Specifically, we look at these 
. '· 
presumed irregularities and ask: do these irregularit.ies imply election fraud, or can 
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they be accounted for by other factors? We should state at the outset that, given 
available data, it is virtually impossible to conclusively prove or disprove the existence 
of election fraud. Instead, proceeding on the basis of circumstantial evidence, we show 
that the hypothesis of fraud is consistent with both observed aggregate patterns 
in the data and the incentives of key players, and that it provides the most likely 
explanations for these patterns. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, the key players of the elec-
toral process, and their incentives to falsify the election results, are identified. In 
particular, although the importance of elections and the formal rules dramatically 
changed, the administration of election machinery remained in the same hands. Sec-
ond, a number of apparent voting irregularities in the data are shown. Third, we 
introduce several alternative models that "explain" these irregularities. These mod-
els are not the only ones consistent with the data and therefore do not exhaust other 
possibilities, but we believe that the options considered are the most realistic possible 
explanations of what happened. Fourth, we present evidence in favor and in opposi-
tion to each model. Finally, concluding remarks state lessons that should be learned 
in the future with respect to election administration. 
The December 1993 Election: Actors and Incen-
tives 
The Central Election Commission, in charge of running the elections, appointed 89 
regional election commissions, which in turn appointed thousands of local commis-
sions. Each region in Russia consists of a number of" rayons" (counties). In the past, 
all rayons had their own election commission. Those commissions were eliminated 
before the December 1993 election (later we discuss an explanation for this change). 
Local (sub-rayon) commissions were in charge of counting votes at precincts and they 
in turn reported the results to regional commissions. After the regional commissions 
received the results, they aggregated the data to the rayon level and prepared official 
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reports for the Central Commission in Moscow. All commissions consisted of working 
members and observers, and each party could assign its representatives to work at 
the commissions as observers. 
Even though the executive structure of elections might look democratic, several 
features suggest the opposite. First, the working members of regional election com-
missions - the only people who had access to the actual ballots - were appointed by 
and worked under the direct control of Heads of Local Administration. This fact 
is extremely important, because in 67 of 89 regions, local "heads" were running for 
seats in the Federation Council. A total of more than 100 representatives of top 
local executive officials were elected to the Federation Council. Only eight of them 
lost. Second, election commissions were not required by law to make voting outcomes 
available to the public on any level of aggregation lower than the regional one. Even 
results aggregated on the regional level have never been published officially. Thus, the 
Central Election Commission released the outcomes of elections after aggregating the 
results to the national level. Only one of the 89 regions (Niznii Novgorod) published 
data at the "rayon" level of aggregation. Third, in most regions members-observers of 
electoral commissions did have access to the data until after they were aggregated to 
the regional level. Moreover, the Central Election Commission deprived its observers 
of the right to see the data until after the results were officially published. 
Although the above factors constitute evidence strong enough to raise the possi-
bility of election fraud (it is difficult to believe that people would not take advantage 
of the opportunities presented to them), a consistent set of incentives should be es-
tablished. As discussed above, local heads were the key players during the elections. 
What were their incentives? On one hand, almost all of them were running for the 
Federation Council. On the other hand, almost none of them was an elected official, 
but were instead appointed by the President. Therefore, their incentives had to have 
much in common with the incentives of their boss. Moreover, old Communist party 
traditions certainly suggested that the best way to show loyalty to the president was 
to prove that the regions were supportive of his interests. 
The only issue on the ballot vital to Yeltsin was the referendum on the Constitu-
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tion, which hinged primarily on turnout. By law, the Constitution would be approved 
only if more than 50 percent of the voters voted "yes," and if turnout exceeded 50 
percent. All public opinion polls suggested that the draft of the constitution was 
supported by a very high margin of probable voters. But the question of turnout was 
up in the air, making the final outcome uncertain. In fact, it would seem that every 
voter who voted against the Constitution acted irrationally, since the constitution 
had a much greater chance of rejection through the mechanism of low turnout than 
by explicit disapproval of the voters. Therefore, the second incentive of local heads· 
was to provide at least 50 percent turnout in their regions. Unusually high rates of 
regional turn.out, then, might be a good indicator of election fraud. 
The election rules, together with incentives, suggest that the expectations of elec-
tion fraud was plausible ex ante. In other words, the environment was not incentive 
compatible with running a clean election. In the following section we present the 
voting irregularities that make the above hypothesis plausible ex post. 
Voting Irregularities 
In the previous section we suggested that the voters turnout was a key parameter of 
the elections. In this section it is suggested that there were significant irregularities 
in the correlation between turnout and different parameters of the election outcomes. 
Moreover, it is crucial that these irregularities are not present in regions where local 
heads were not running, or were running and lost. Before we focus on actual irregu-
larities that have been found in the data, it is important to state what is presumed 
to be a "regular" election outcome with respect to the turnout as an independent 
variable. Suppose that an election for a single seat is held in a large number of fairly 
homogeneous districts, and different percentages of eligible electorate turned out to 
vote in these districts. Assume, furthermore, that the election is a two-candidate 
election (for example, the presidential vote). It is natural to believe that the more 
voters showed up to vote, the more votes (in absolute numbers) are cast for each of 
the candidates. Later in this section we show that this assumption was violated in 
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many of Russia's districts in the December of 1993. The following section presents a 
number of models of electoral behavior that could account for such violations. 
Formally, the notion of an irregularity of correlation is defined as follows. Let 
voting outcomes on an issue be described by variables Tfor, Tag and T (T = Ttor+Tag), 
where Tfor is the percentage of the total number of eligible voters who supported the 
issue, Tag is the percentage of the total number of eligible voters who oppose the 
issue, and T is the turnout. Therefore, the main implication of the model is that T 
should be positively correlated with both Tfor and Tag· In other words, the higher 
turnout, the higher is the absolute numbers of people who supported or opposed the 
issue. Thus, according to the model, we call election results regular if T is positively 
correlated with the two other variables, T10 r and Tag, and the model is as follows: 
T1 0r = A x T, and Tag = B x T, 
where A determines the level of support, and B determines degree of opposition 
for the issue. Obviously: 
A+B=l. 
The econometric model of a "regular" election can be written as 
where i corresponds to a district number within a region, and A0 and B 0 are 
expected to be equal zero. As we noted earlier, the lowest level of data aggregation 
officially available was the level of region (state), whereas the data we consider are 
aggregated at the rayon (county) level. The information offered here has never been 
officially published and remains officially unavailable. It was collected by a number 
of different sources in the regions who were close to local administrations. In total, 
the elections outcomes are available in the form of 1300 observations, which cover 36 
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regions and 55 percent of the Russian electorate. Let us turn our attention to the 
OLS estimates of the above regressions. The analysis was conducted separately for 
36 regions using rayon level data as individual observations for balloting results on 
two separate issues: the Referendum on the constitution and parliamentary election 
by party lists. On each of the two issues, the regressions results are presented in two 
separate tables. The regions in which heads of local elites where running for the seats 
and won are combined in one table, and the rest of the regions are placed in the other 
table. 
The data in Tables la and lb show the estimated coefficients for voting on the 
Constitution. Notice that in the regions where local heads either were not running 
or lost (Table la), all the coefficients in the regressions for the "Yes" votes are sig-
nificantly different from zero, and, in most cases, the intercepts are close to zero, 
consistently with the model of a "regular" election. In contrast, in approximately 
fifty percent of the regions where local heads ran and won, these coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the coefficients that concern the 
"No" votes are significant and positive in all of the regions. 
The data in Tables 2a and 2b present OLS estimates of the above model for the 
parliamentary election outcomes. The 13 political parties that took part in the elec-
tion are divided into two groups: anti-reformists and reformists. The first group 
includes the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party, and the nationalist Liberal De-
moctaric Party. The other parties are put into the second group. As far as the 
reformist parties are concerned, in all but two of the regions where the local heads 
won the election, the results are inconsistent with the model of a "regular" election. 
On the other hand, in the second group of the regions, these coefficients are signif-
icant and positive. The data in Tables 3 and 4 present separate OLS estimates for 
the members of the anti-reformist group. This consistency check shows if those three 
parties are considered separately then the results hold. This means that there is no 
aggregation bias in the analysis of the anti-reformist block as a whole. 
Thus, we see that the December 1993 election results are consistent with the 
model of a "regular" election in the regions where local bosses either lost the election 
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or did not run for a seat. The analysis also shows that every increment in turnout 
added virtually zero votes for the block of democratic parties in each and every region 
where local heads won the election. The same increment in turnout added votes for 
the block of anti-reformist parties. The results are mixed, however, for the voting 
on the constitutional issue. Notice that average turnout was much smaller in the 
first group of the regions than in the second group. In fact, in the regions where 
local bosses were not running or lost, average turnout was less than fifty percent -
the threshold necessary for the constitution to be approved. In the next section we 
consider a number of models which could account for the observed irregularities. 
Figures 1 - 6 provide visible illustrations of this data. All graphs portray turnout 
on the horizontal axis and either Tf or or Tag on the vertical. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show 
absolute percentages of those who supported or opposed the constitution for three 
typical regions. Figures 4, 5 and 6 illustrate different patterns for party lists for the 
same three regions. In two of the three regions, local bosses won the election, and in 
the third region (Sverdlovsk), the local boss lost the election. 
Finally, unusually high turnout in rural areas looks suspicious for that time of 
the year. For the territories with essentially no roads, no buses, and no telephones, 
with very short periods of daylight, and with the temperature falling below -30° (F), 
it is hard to believe that 80 percent of eligible voters were able to get to precincts 
by traveling, in many cases, dozens of miles. On ~he other hand big cities, with 
much closer polling places and much better transportation, produced only 49 percent 
turnout. 
Models: Election Fraud or Something Else? 
The first model presented in this section focuses on the election fraud as a possible 
explanation of the observed irregularities. Before the model is considered, it is impor-
tant to provide a definition of what we mean by saying. the words" election fraud." We 
assume that such actions as ballot-stuffing, doctori:p.g numbers in official protocols, 
. ' 
and illegal voter mobilization should all be consider~d parts of election fraud. It is 
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often impossible to distinguish which of these factors played a crucial role in an elec-
tion outcome by merely looking at the aggregate voting data. In fact, the cornerstone 
of the analysis presented here - the suspiciously high turnout in some areas compared 
to others - could be a result of any of these factors. Therefore, it is not a purpose 
of this research to prove that election fraud occurred in the form of, for example, 
ballot-stuffing. Instead, we show that the high turnout numbers and related voting 
patterns do not seem to be a result of a free and fair election. 
Irregularities in the data suggest that in the regions where local heads of adminis-
tration won a seat in the Federation Council, every increment in turnout resulted in 
the same increment in percentage of votes cast against the block of democratic parties 
in the party list competition for State Duma seats, and, in more than 50 percent of 
such regions, against Constitution. For many observers, the obvious explanation of 
this pattern is ballot box stuffing or other forms of election fraud as discussed above. 
Local heads who ran for seats in the Federation Council and who administered the 
elections had a clear incentive and opportunity to increase the numbers of votes cast 
for them in the protocols aggregated to the rayon level 1 or make rayon officials to 
organize such a voters mobilization that the election would produce a desirable out-
come. They were able to do this without danger of being caught since rayon election 
commissions had been eliminated. Also, they did not have to do it for all rayons. In-
stead, it was enough for them to "play" with only those rayons where nobody would 
be likely to check anything. It is not hard to guess that those rayons would be mostly 
rural. At the same time election outcomes on other issues were also altered to make 
vote totals consistent with the Federation Council returns. Moreover, by increasing 
the numbers for the Constitution, the second goal could be achieved - exceeding the 
50 percent turnout level sought by Yeltsin. It is important to note that in the regions 
where local heads either were not running or just lost, average turnout was less than 
50 percent whereas it exceeded 60 percent in the rest of the regions. 
1 Protocols are the only official documents that contain information about election returns at any 
level of aggregation. For example, there are precinct protocols, rayon protocols, etc. The data that 
we present in this paper were taken directly from copies of rayon protocols. 
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Formally, the model of a "fraudulent" election is as follows. First, the "true" elec-
tion outcomes had constant turnout across the districts. Second, different numbers 
of fraudulent ballots where added in different districts to support only one side of 
the issue on the ballot. In other words, all additional ballots supported only anti-
reformist parties. Thus, the turnout becomes a random variable which positively 
correlates only with votes cast for these anti-reformist parties which is consistent 
with the irregularities described in the previous section. 
If the presumption of election fraud is correct, then the data suggest that in 
about 50 percent of cases, the extra ballots were marked "against" the Constitution, 
and in the other 50 percent of cases, the extra ballots were marked "for" as well 
as "against" the Constitution. How can this supposition be explained? First, one 
should notice that it was easy to alternate numbers in only one column of the protocol, 
since the numbers had to be consistent across protocols. Second, according to pre-
election polls, the constitutional draft was supported by more than 70 percent of 
the population. Thus if one decides to stuff ballots for the Constitution, the final 
numbers may look unrealistic (like 90 percent vs. 10 percent). Third, if, as we 
discussed above, the numbers were mostly altered for rural rayons, there would be less 
notice of irregularities because local, rayon authorities were overwhelmingly opposed 
to reforms. The reason of such an attitude rests on the fact that in rural rayons 
land was basically the only valuable good that local bosses could control. It is also 
well known that one of the bills that democrats were trying to pass through the 
parliament would allow private ownership of land, thus depriving rayon heads from 
their control over land distribution and management. This issue turned most of the 
rural rayon bosses away from the democratic camp. Thus, altering numbers in party 
lists outcomes by adding votes to an anti-reform bloc was also in keeping with their 
objectives. But the question still remains about the other 50 percent of the regions 
where balloting on the constitution seems to be regular while party lists votes are 
irregular. If one assumes that there was no election fraud in these regions, then a 
contradiction in voters preferences is inevitable. Namely, there must have been voters 
who voted "against" democratic parties and "for" the Constitution. On the other 
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hand, leaders of the anti-reformist parties appealed to their electorates to oppose the 
Constitution. Therefore, in these regions ends do not meet as in the other regions. 
Now let us consider some alternative hypothesis that explain the preceding irreg-
ularities without presuming significant fraud. We discuss two possibilities. The first 
presumes deterministic turnout among pro-reform voters and random turnout among 
anti-reform voters. Let us assume that everybody who supported the Constitution 
and democratic reforms decided whether or not to vote early in the campaign, and 
that the numbers of those pro-reform voters who decided to vote divided by the total 
numbers of registered voters were constant across rayons and oblasts. In contrast, 
suppose the opposition voted randomly. Everyone against reform would flip a coin 
in the morning of the election day in deciding whether or not to vote. Therefore, the 
total turnout can be presented as a sum of a deterministic (democrats) and a random 
(communists) components. This implies that any variance in the total turnout is due 
to the variance in the percentage of anti-reform persons who turned out to vote. Al-
though this model can "explain" the correlation irregularities in the data, which are 
presented in Tables 1-2, and assumes no fraud, it cannot account for the increasing 
variance of votes in support of the Constitution as turnout increases. Second, it is 
unclear why people with different political affiliations should have different proba-
bilistic voting strategies. Most importantly, it is suspicious that the model works for 
the regions where local heads won, and fails in the regions where local heads lost or 
were not running. 
Another alternative model assumes the presence of a third variable which is pos-
itively correlated with both turnout and opposition to the reforms. It is known that 
turnout and numbers of people who voted with the opposition are traditionally greater 
in rural areas. For example, if turnout in rural areas were 70 percent, and only 45 per-
cent of voters supported reforms, while turnout in urban areas were 45 percent, and 
70 percent of voters supported reforms, then the absolute support of opposition would 
increase with turnout, as the data suggest. Thus the percentage of rural population 
in a district can be that "third" variable that explains the irregularities discussed in 
the previous section. The strongest argument against this model is the fact that the 
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irregularities are not homogeneous. In other words, there are regions where voters in 
rural areas opposed both reformist parties and the Constitution, and there is approx-
im,ately the same number of regions where rural voters opposed reformist parties but 
supported the Constitution. A more plausible explanation behind rural versus urban 
effect in Russia's electorate is based on the fact that economic and political reforms 
had much more impact on urban areas than on rural ones. Therefore, urban voters 
have a good sense of what free and fair elections should look like, while rural voters 
still have strong memories of how elections were conducted in 70's and 80's resulting 
in 99.9 percent turnout and 99.9 percent support for a communist candidate. Also, 
it is much easier to commit unlawful voters mobilization in rural areas by promising 
that those who do not vote or those who vote "incorrectly" would be denied a number 
of goods and bonuses that the government still distributes in rural areas. Finally, this 
model also fails to accommodate the fact that voting irregularities are present in the 
regions where local heads won, and are not present in the regions where local heads 
lost or were not running. 
Concluding Remarks 
The main finding of this research is the fact that election irregularities are present in 
the regions where local heads won the election and are not present in other regions. 
That constitutes a piece of evidence in favor of the fact that election fraud was 
the source of these irregularities. Although our analysis does not prove beyond the 
reasonable doubt the fact the crime was committed, in a democratic country such 
a piece of evidence could become a basis for a more profound legal investigation. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case for Russia. The original ballots were destroyed 
shortly after the election, and the complete official set of protocols is still unavailable 
for the public. 
If the hypothesis about fraud holds, then what can be done to prevent such prob-
lems in future? Several suggestions can be offered. First, the local electoral com-
missions should be neither controlled nor appointed by local officials. Moreover, the 
96 whole organizational process should be separated from local authorities. This could be done in several different ways. For example, those commissions can be formed us­ing a jury selection process. In other words, local election commissions can be formed of people who are randomly selected by computer and are not in any way affiliated with local administrations. Those people would count the ballots and report the data to the central election commission and to representatives of political parties and electoral blocs. Second, observers should be allowed to witness the election without any restriction. Third, a law must be written to establish criminal responsibility for election fraud. Finally, election outcomes must be accessible to the public at all levels of aggregation. Everybody should have access to the data.Another way to prevent election fraud is to establish a systematic mechanism of control that would detect election irregularities if any occur. As an example, let us consider a hypothetical group of observers that would cover a number of randomly preselected precincts (1-2 percent of the total number). It is clear that if those ob­servers can insure fraud-free election at their precincts, and then the data from those precincts are aggregated, the results should not be significantly different from ones officially announced for the entire nation. On the other hand, if there is significant difference, then an investigation should be launched to check for election fraud.Finally, it is important to note that this chapter's findings do not invalidate the results of the analysis of the Chapter 3 which was based on the assumption that election returns are clean form falsifications. Even if the hypothesis about election fraud in 1993 is correct, and all of the detected irregularities are due to falsifications then, as Sobyanin (1994) pointed out, the amount of the faked ballots does not exceed 10 percent of the total vote. Remember that the methodology used in the previous chapter is designed to uncover general trends in the how of votes between elections rather than the exact parameters of such processes. The consistency checks (aggregate totals), as reported in Tables 2-7, show errors of a magnitude 5 to 10 percent per regression. This means that if the assumption about election fraud does not hold then the magnitude of such a noise in the data does not exceed the precision of the analysis, and, therefore, does not interfere with the conclusions of the chapter
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3. 
However a number of interesting observations can be made by comparing the 
results of the last two chapters. Notice that a number of inconsistencies detected in 
the previous chapter, such as negative coefficients, totals in excess or below of 100 
percent as well as results that contradict to some well known political facts, pertain 
only to the Communist party, the Agrarian party and the LDPR. These contradictions 
are only present when the December 1993 elections are involved. For example, the 
only negative coefficient in the Table 2 belongs to the Agrarian party, the total for 
the Communist party in the Table 3 exceeds 150 percent while LDPR's 10 percent 
support among Yeltsin's supporters (Table 3) obvio.usly does not make much sense. 
On the other hand as far as other parties and elections are concerned, no significant 
irregularities are observed. Totals in the Tables 2,4 and 6 add up to almost 100 
percent each while the results clearly make sense. The same is true for the reformist 
parties when the December 1993 elections are involved (Tables 3,5 and 7). Moreover, 
the last result of the previous chapter shows that the "rural vs. urban" effect was 
not a factor in determining the flow of votes. Thus, we conjecture that since the 
irregularities independently found in the last two chapters involve the same players 
then they might have the same nature - election fraud. 
Recently Russian voters reelected Boris Yeltsin to the second term of his presi-
dency. According to many observers the election con,duct appears to have been rather 
clean without any significant allegations of election fraud or misconduct. Does this 
fact mean that the problem of election fraud has be'en resolved and will not arise in 
the future? Although the election data are yet to be studied, a few rather optimistic 
conjectures can be made today. First, and most importantly, political culture of Rus-
sian voters has become much more mature over past few years. It appears that voters 
in rural areas do not assume anymore that they have to cast their ballots the way 
their bosses suggest. It is also apparent that voters paid attention to, and inferred 
information from, the pre-election campaign. A good piece of evidence in support 
of this fact is Yeltsin's approval increase from 5 percent in January to 35 percent in 
June. Secondly, local authorities seem to have realized that they cannot manipulate 
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election returns the way they want any more because the number of observers has 
increased by a factor of ten over the past four years. Finally, the Central Election 
Commission is now obligated to publish election returns no later than 90 days after 
an election. Therefore, it is harder for authorities in Moscow to alter just national 
aggregate totals and claim that the more refined data do not exists. If all this is true 
and will hold, then future Russian elections may well look like western ones where 





Table la: OLS Estimates of Voting on the Constitution 
Regions, where Local Bosses Lost the Election or were Non Running 
"For" the Constitution "Against" the Constitution 
Region Coefficient (A) Ao Coefficient(B) so Rz 
Kamchatka oblast .91 7* .06 -8* .85 
Magadan oblast .41 5* .53 -3* .61 
Murmansk oblast .51 4* .43 -5* .64 
Perm oblast .62 1* .35 -1* .53 
Kalmik republic .19 -3* .82 4* .11 
Sahalin oblast .74 -4* .14 3* .54 
Sverdlovsk oblast .61 7 .36 -6 .71 
Tomsk oblast .55 O* .42 O* .47 
Khabarovsk krai .69 1* .19 -1* .22 
Chelyabinsk oblast .56 O* .41 O* .51 
Chukotka region .74 2* .18 -2* .32 
"*" - the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at .05 level. 
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Table lb: OLS Estimates of the Voting on the Constitution 
Regions, where Local Bosses Won the Election 
"For" "Against" 
Region A Ao B Bo R2 
Archangelsk oblast .53 1* .43 -1* .54 
Belgorod oblast .01* 27 .98 -28 .67 
Bryansk oblast .08* 22 .91 -23 .60 
Vladimir oblast .37 4* . 61 -5* . .48 
Volgograd oblast -.10* 31 1.08 -32 .88 
Vologda oblast .55 O* .43 O* .35 
Voronez o blast .00* 27 1.01 -28 .89 
Kalin.in.grad oblast .46 -2* .49 1* .56 
Kaluga oblast .13* 23 .88 -25 .76 
Kemerovo oblast .43 -1* .56 1* .72 
Kirov oblast .18* 19 .76 -21 .40 
Krasnoyarsk krai .39 11 .59 -11 .68 
Kursk oblast .09* 19 .88 -20 .69 
Moscow oblast .50 3* .45 -4* .54 
Niznii Novgorod oblast .06* 26 .95 -27 .79 
Novgorod oblast .58 -5* .42 6* .71 
Oren.burg oblast .23 18 .75 -19 .62 
Orel oblast .20* 13 .78 -14 .79 
Penza oblast -.06* 29 1.07 -30 .78 
Chuvashia republic -.28 43 1.24 -42 .89 
Saratov oblast .22 16 .76 -16 .75 
Smolensk oblast -.13* 37 1.16 -38 .81 
Tver oblast .00* 30 1.00 -32 .76 
Tula oblast .09* 21 .87 -22 .69 
Ulianovsk o blast .04* 27 .95 -28 .76 
"*" - the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at .05 level. 
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Table 2a: OLS Estimates of the Party Competition Model 
Regions, where Local Bosses Lost the Election or were Non Running 
Reformist Parties Anti-Reformist Parties 
Region Coefficient (A) Ao Coefficient( B) Bo R2 
Kamchatka oblast .68 4* .24 -5* .81 
Magadan oblast .55 6* .32 -6* .78 
Murmansk oblast .40 1* .57 O* .75 
Perm oblast .44 3* .52 -2* .57 
Kalmik republic .30 5* .71 -7* .24 
Sahalin oblast .53 O* .44 O* .43 
Sverdlovsk oblast .24 20 .71 -20 .56 
Tomsk oblast .29 10 .64 -11 .77 
Khabarovsk krai .51 -1* .32 1* .62 
Chelyabinsk oblast .16 20 .76 -20 .61 
Chukotka region .84 3* .10 -4* .93 
"*" - the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at .05 level. 
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Table 2b: OLS Estimates of the Party Competition Model 
Regions, where Local Bosses Won the Election 
Reformist Parties Anti-Reformist Parties 
Region A Ao B Bo R2 
Archangelsk o blast .36 0 .63 0 .56 
Belgorod oblast -.24 39 1.22 -42 .86 
Bryansk oblast -.01* 35 1.01 -13 .74 
Vladimir oblast -.00* 34 1.00 -34 .74 
Volgograd oblast -.32 41 1.30 -45 .90 
Vologda oblast -.04* 31 1.05 -34 .67 
Voronez oblast -.17* 36 1.15 -37 .88 
Kaliningrad o blast -.05* 33 1.05 -35 .46 
Kaluga oblast -.04* 39 1.04 -47 .85 
Kemerovo oblast .09* 22 .90 -26 .90 
Kirov o blast -.07* 26 1.06 -33 .70 
Krasnoyarsk krai .03* 26 .94 -26 .80 
K ursk o blast -.23 35 1.24 -40 .92 
Moscow oblast .02* 37 .97 -34 .79 
Niznii Novgorod oblast -.20 38 1.14 -40 .82 
Novgorod oblast .06* 24 .93 -30 .83 
Orenburg oblast -.13* 32 1.10 -35 .85 
Orel oblast -.07* 35 1.08 -37 .91 
Penza oblast -.27 40 1.26 -43 .89 
Chuvashia republic -.34 47 1.21 -47 .91 
Saratov oblast .11* 30 .86 -24 .59 
Smolensk oblast -.31 43 1.24 -43 .89 
Tver oblast -.29 46 1.33 -52 .92 
Tula oblast -.22 42 1.22 -.46 .88 
Ulianovsk oblast -.12* 34 1.13 -37 .87 
"*" - the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at .05 level. 
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Table 3: OLS Estimates of the Party Competition Model
Anti-Reformist Parties Listed Separately
Regions, where Local Bosses Lost the Election or were Non Running
Region CPRF APR LDPR
Kamchatka oblast .04 .04 .17
Magadan oblast .10 .04 .19
Murmansk oblast .08 .01' .49
Perm oblast .05 .26 .20
Kalmik republic .11 .40 .19
Sahalin oblast .02* .09* .44
Sverdlovsk oblast .17 .15 .36
Tomsk oblast .10 .16 .41
Khabarovsk krai .01 .05 .22
Chelyabinsk oblast .11 .30 .34
Chukotka region .13 .08 .03
" *" - the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at .05 level
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Table 4: 018 Estimates of the Party Competition Model 
Anti-Reformist Parties Listed Separately 
Regions, where Local Bosses Won the Election 
Region CPRF APR LDPR 
Archangelsk oblast .07 .19 .36 
Belgorod oblast .25 .61 .36 
Bryansk oblast .31 .53 .18 
Vladimir oblast .09 .52 .38 
Volgograd oblast . 19 .69 . .42 
Vologda oblast .04 .90 .10 
Voronez oblast .22 .57 .39 
Kaliningrad oblast .09 .16 .69 
Kaluga oblast .25 .76 .08 
Kemerovo oblast .11 .41 .37 
Kirov o blast .09 .83 .13 
Krasnoyarsk krai .11 .35 .49 
K ursk o blast .24 .46 .42 
Moscow oblast .28 .11 .42 
Niznii Novgorod oblast .13 .34 .46 
Novgorod oblast .12 .64 .31 
Orenburg oblast .48 .40 .30 
Orel oblast .43 .54 .14 
Penza oblast .07 .49 .36 
Chuvashia republic .51 .77 -.07* 
Saratov oblast .13 .43 .29 
Smolensk oblast .23 .80 .20 
Tver oblast .18 .93 .23 
Tula oblast .25 .56 .40 
Ulianovsk oblast .27 .73 .11 
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Chapter 5 Appendixes 
Chapter 2 
In this section we present formal proofs of the results (equilibrium strategies), which 
are discussed on pp. 8-9. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only the case of the 
initial status quo laying to the left of the core, as shown in Figure 1. If the status quo 
is to the right of the core, the results are perfectly symmetrical to those presented 
below. 
We assume that the Speaker always makes the first move by positioning the initial 
version of a bill ( B 0 ) in the policy space. After the deputees observe this move, they 
react by voting "yes" or "no" and by making amendments. At the second stage of the 
game, the Speaker can make his own amendments and reorder the set of previously 
made ones. 
Since we assume that the Speaker acts as a rational utility-maximizer within 
the framework of our model, and that he is the leader of this game, the equilibrium 
outcomes are formulated in terms of the best outcomes that the Speaker can guarantee 
himself. Propositions 1, 2 and 3 find those best outcomes and strategies contingent 
on different Speaker's ideal point locations in the policy space ( hi·). Remember that 
for now we only consider the case when the status 'quo is located to the left of the 
core. 
In general, the Propositions below prove that the Speaker can guarantee himself 
either B 0 or any point inside the interval [c1; r 1(B0 )]. The following two statements 
are keys to understand the results. First, unless the Speaker wishes to live with the 
initial status quo, the location of the final outcome will belong to the core. Second, if 
the final outcome belongs to the core, then it should lay to the left of the indifference 
point of the pivotal voter, r 1(B0). The intuition behind the former rests on the fact 
that if a bill passes "as background" and, therefore; is open for amendments, there 
. i 
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exists a deputee who will be willing to make an amendment, which would pass and 
bring the bill inside the core. As we know from the definition of the core, the bill 
cannot be amended if it is located in the core. The intuition behind the latter follows 
from the claim that the pivotal voter has to like the final version of the bill more than 
the initial status quo. Otherwise the bill would fail "as a whole." 
Proposition 1 states that if the Speaker's ideal point is to the left of the initial 
status quo then he will retain it. 
Proposition 1. If hi· :S B 0 , then the best outcome the Speaker can attain is B 0 , 
by proposing B* :S B 0 • 
Proof. Let us define R as a final location of the bill in the policy space. Suppose 
there exists such a sequence A= {a1, ... ,ak} that R < B0. This means that R won 
the final vote against B0 • This implies that l{i, Ui(R) 2: Ui(B0 )}1 2: 2N/3. On the 
other hand we know that R < B0 < c1. By the definition of c1 and Ui ( x), we get 
l{i, Ui(x) 2: Ui(B0)}1 < N/3. This is a contradiction. 
Definition. The point ri(x) is called the indifference point for deputy i with respect 
to a point x iff Ui(ri(x)) = Ui(x). 
Lemma I. If the voter i is such that hi 2: c1, and if x belongs to [ B 0 , .•. , rl ( B 0 )], 
then Ui(x) 2: Ui(B0 ). 
Proof. Let d = hi - c1 2: 0. The assumption of homogeneous utility functions 
implies that Ui(x) = Ui(x - d), Ui(B0 ) = U1(B0 - d). Consider two cases. First 
assume that x - d 2: h1• Then Ui(x - d) 2: Uz(B0) by the definition of the indifference 
point, and U1(B0 - d) :S Ui(B0) because of monotonicity. This implies that Ui(x) = 
U1(x - d) 2: Uz(B0 - d) = Ui(B0 ). Secondly, assume that x - d < hz. Then U1(x) is 
an increasing function on the interval that contains both points B 0 - d and x - d. 
This implies that Ui(x) = U1(x - d) 2: Uz(B0 - d) = Ui(B0 ) and Lemma I is proved. 
Lemma II. If the voter i is such that hi :S c1 and if x > rl(B0 ), then Ui(x) < 
Ui(B0 ). 
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of the Lemma I. 
Lemma III. If the voters vote sincerely, the initial status quo B 0 is to the left from 
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c1 and R is an equilibrium outcome, then: 
B 0 E ((c1, ... , c2] n [B0, ... , r1(B0)]) U B0 . 
Proof. The fact that B 0 is in the set of equilibrium outcomes was proved in Propo-
sition 1. Now let us find what may be accepted as B*. It follows from Proposition 1, 
Lemma I, and Lemma II that these can only be points in the interval [B0 , .. , r1(B0)] 
and only them. If B* is in the core and it is accepted, then R = B*. Let us take any 
point x from the above interval which is not in the core ( x < c1 for example) and any 
sequence of amendments A= { a1, ... , ak} that results in the final outcome R which is 
not in the core (and is not the point B0 ). Let us take a subsequence A'= {a1 , ... , ap} 
of A such that any as in A' was accepted at some stage. First, we know that no points 
in the set A' are from the core. This follows from the fact that R is not in the core. 
Secondly, observe the structure of A', namely: 
Now we can take any voter i such that hi 2: c2 and note that that voter has an 
incentive to deviate and make and amendment a*= c1 + E, which is in the core and 
would be accepted if placed anywhere in the vector A. This means the triple (x, A, R) 
does not constitute an equilibrium. This is a contradiction and we conclude that any 
equilibrium outcome ( except B 0 ) must be in the core. The Lemma is proved. 
Lemma IV. Any point in the equilibrium set of Lemma I can be achieved as a 
result of some particular strategy of the Speaker, and does not depend on deputies' 
strategies. 
Proof. The fact that point B 0 can be achieved follows from Proposition 1. Now 
let us take any point x from the core such that x ::; r1(B1 ). If the speaker makes 
B* = x, then the Lemma I implies that it is accepted and the definition of the core 
implies that no amendments can beat it. The final vote will pass, because this is 
essentially the same vote as B 0 versus B*. The Lemma is proved. 
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The next two Propositions follow directly from Lemmas III and IV. 
Proposition 2 states that if the Speaker's ideal point is in between the initial status 
quo and the left hand bound of the core (c1), then the Speaker may choose between 
B 0 and c1. 
Proposition 2. If hi· > B 0 and hi* S c1, then the best outcome the Speaker can 
attain is a= argmax{Ui·(B0 ), Ui•(c1)}. 
Proposition 3 lists the Speaker's best outcomes contingent on different locations 
of his ideal point, if it is to the right of c1. 
Proposition 3. If hi* > c1 , then the best outcome the Speaker can attain is: 
h* if f h* S r1(B0) and h* S c2 
c2 otherwise 
We thus show that the Speaker, when the status quo is to the left of the core, 
can attain either the initial status quo or the point which is closest to his ideal point 
among the core points which are to the left of l's indifference point. If the status quo 
is to the right of the core, the results are symmetric. 
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Chapter 6 Endnotes 
Chapter 2 
1. A number of highly influential formal analyses reveal that all voting systems are 
vulnerable to strategic manipulation (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975; McKelvey 
1976). 
2. From regular territorial districts, 900 deputies were elected, 84 from au-
tonomous ethnic-national territories, and 84 from non-ethnic national territories). 
3. The actual term for this position was the President of the Congress, but we 
use the term Speaker to differentiate it from the office of President of Russia. 
4. To receive formal recognition, groups and fractions required a minimum mem-
bership of at least 50 deputies. Groups were to be based on "non-political" principles 
while fractions were explicitly political in nature. Each fraction had the right to name 
representatives to any committee or other organization of the Congress. Blocs were 
formed by the alliance of three or more fractions. 
5. They assume that budgetary referendum proposals were made by school dis-
trict superintendents (who were presumably budget.maximizers), even though theses 
officials were ostensibly subordinate to popularly elected school boards. 
6. Utility functions are assumed to have the follo~ing properties: 
• ui ( x) is differentiable for any x 
• u; ( x) > 0 for x < hi ' u; ( x) < 0 for x > hi 
• Ui(x) > 0 for any x 
• Ui(hi + x) = Uj(hj + x) for any i and j in I ::l,nd for any x 
7. In contrast, the core of the simple majority rule game under these same con-
ditions (voters with single-peaked preferences along.a single dimension) is, as Black's 
 
116theorem tells us, a single point—the ideal point of the median voter.8. It might seem that the Speaker could propose a Æ* located between and c∖ as it would easily gamer more than two-thirds support. To do so, however, would be a mistake. Even though the Speaker had "gatekeeping" power, i.e., he could simply refrain from offering a proposal once a bill was accepted as background, he could not necessarily prevent amendments horn coming to the floor that would move the bill to the left of c∖ thus making him worse off.9. If the pivotal voters' utility functions are hat enough, their indifference points (r'(,3°) or r*^(β°)) may be located outside of c^ and c^. In this case the Speaker could obtain any outcome located within the core.10. NOMINATE maximizes the log likelihood function, which is not the same thing as maximizing correct category predictions. The NOMINATE results we report here are based upon a coding that treats abstentions as missing data. We also scaled the roll call data under the alternative method of coding abstentions as no votes. The resultant scores were very similar to what we obtained in treating abstentions as missing data, but the statistical fit was not as good.11. See Heckman and Snyder (1992) for an excellent discussion of the relationship between NOMINATE and principal components (factor) analysis.12. NOMINATE estimates of alternative locations are based upon how accurately the scaled dimensions describe voting patterns: the more accurately the cutpoint discriminates between those who vote "Yes" versus those who vote "No", the farther apart the alternatives are estimated to be. This technique is based upon standard precepts of cognitive psychology, but it is very different from the procedure by which NOMINATE estimates the (normalized) positions of deputies.13. Romer and Rosenthal assume that the agenda-setter in their model was a budget maximizer, and thus always preferred more than he could extract from the median voter.14. The number of voting deputies declined from congress to congress due to the death or resignation of some deputies and the inability to replace them in by-elections.15. According to the figures in Table 6, four of the 55 constitutional bills approved
117by the RCPD in these two sessions had cutpoints inside of what we had calculated to be the "average" and "reliable" cores. In these cases unusually high turnout acted to malce the edges of the core less extreme.
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Chapter 3 
1. Table 1 as well as our subsequent analyses of the 1995 election groups party lists 
as follows: the row denoted 'other democrats' consists of B. Federov, Pamfivoliva, 
and Borovoy's lists, as well as '89', Christian Democrats, and FDD; the row denoted 
Rybkin and Shakrai (Unity and Accord) includes as well Stable Russia, Block of 
Independents, and Transition of the Homeland; and the row denoted Derzhava also 
includes For the Homeland and Power to the People. 
2. Notice that the data from one election to the next are not strictly comparable, 
and that even within the December 1993 election, we have data covering a slightly 
different set of rayons when comparing the Duma party list elections and the con-
stitutional referendum. Thus, when analyzing pairs of elections, each data set must 
be readjusted so that it concerns only those rayons for which we have data on both 
elections. 
3. Notice that the usual form of a model intended to be estimated by standard 
econometric techniques would include an error term, usually additive and assumed to 
be independently and normally distributed. Here, however, since our variables must 
sum to a constant, the only source of stochastic error, contrary to our assumption, is 
variation in the values of our coefficients across the data. A priori, then, we know that 
any error term will not satisfy the usual assumptions employed to ensure unbiased 
estimates of coefficients. Unfortunately, there is no way to know the direction of this 
bias, nor do we know of any procedures for eliminating it. However, dividing our 
sample into various subpopulations (see this essay's last section) and rerunning our 
regressions will provide a partial check on the severity of the problem as well as a 
check for aggregation error. 
4. This is not to say that we assume that urban voters have the same preferences 
as rural ones. That assumption is patently false. Rather, aggregation error can pose 
a problem if, for instance, urban voters, when they grow disenchanted with reform 
and Yeltsin, defect to different parties than do rural voters. 
5. Although the issue does not arise here, to simplify subsequent tables, coefficients 
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that are not significantly different from zero are reported as 0. 
6. Since turnout is greater in 1991 than in April 1993 and since we assume, in 
effect, that all those who voted in 1993 voted in 1991, there is no 'nonvoter' column 
in Table 2 - those who failed to vote in 1991 are assumed to have not voted in 1993. 
Also, turnout in a few rayons (less than 50 in any pair of elections) move in a direction 
opposite that of the national average and, thus, in a direction inconsistent with our 
assumption. These rayons are deleted from the analysis. 
7. Since invalid ballots in April 1993 are such a small share of the electorate, we 
delete this column from our presentation. 
8. However, to simplify presentation, we delete the column corresponding to in-
valid ballots or ballots cast against all candidates since they constitute an insignificant 
part of the data, less than 4 percent. 
\, 
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